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 This dissertation is aimed at explaining the development of the Thai economy 
from 1970 to 2010 from the Marxian and post-Keynesian perspectives: in particular, how 
the nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand interacts with its balance-of-payments constraint. 
The theoretical core of this dissertation, constructed in Chapter 2, is developed from the 
extended Thirlwall’s law, in which capital flows, determined by the rate of profit, play a 
role to drive economic growth via balance-of-payments expansion, and from changes of 
the rate of profit due to changes in the organic composition of capital, determined by 
flows of foreign capitals. The model suggests that the dynamic interaction between the 
rate of profit and level of GDP generated from capitals flows most likely results in 
cyclical movements of these two variables.  
 The rest of the dissertation consists of empirical works on the Thai economy. The 
nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand from 1970 to 2010 is measured in Chapter 3, and the 
decomposition analysis reveals the factors behind its fluctuations. The results show that 
the organic composition of capital and the output-capital ratio are the factors determining 
the nonfarm rate of profit.  
 The model in Chapter 2, in order to explain cycles of an economy, requires two 
preliminary assumptions. First, the balance-of-payments-constrained growth models can 
explain its economic growth, and, second, the rate of profit determines the growth rate of 
capital flows. Chapter 4 proves these two assumptions by using the Thai data. To prove 
the first assumption, the full course of Thirlwall’s law test is done, and it is found that the 
	  	  
	  	   iv	  
extended Thirlwall’s law is better than the original Thirlwall’s law in order to predict the 
Thai economic growth rates. For the second assumption, the ARDL bound testing in 
Chapter 3 determines the growth rate of capital flows.  
Chapter 5 puts together the nonfarm rate of profit and the GDP level generated 
from the extended Thirlwall’s law. The empirical diagram behaves quite similarly to the 
theoretical diagram presented in Chapter 2, so the theoretical core of this dissertation can 
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1971 could be marked as the year of Thailand’s first step towards the process of 
industrialization, since it was the year in which the third five-year National Economic and 
Social Development plan encouraging multifarious domestic productions was officially 
issued. One of the early apparent results of the plan was that the Thai economy, which 
used to be a pure agrarian economy, had intensive diversifications of domestic production, 
so industrial sectors were rapidly developed (Doner 2009: 102). After that, the country 
fully entered the world capitalist system in which foreign-related economic activities 
have yielded both positive and negative impact. In the mid-1980s, after the devaluation of 
Thai baht, which raised Thai industries’ competitiveness of exports, the export-oriented 
strategy was fully implemented and exports became a main engine of economic growth 
(Akarasanee, et al. 1991). Foreign capital in forms of external debts via the banking 
system, portfolio investments via the stock market, and foreign direct investments 
tremendously flew into the country to finance investments in industrial and service 
sectors and thus fueled rapid economic growth. Interestingly, between the late 1980s to 
the early 1990s, the Thai economy was the fastest-growing economy in the world (Warr 
and Nidhiprabha 1996: 2), and it was considered as the fifth Asian Tiger1 (Muscat 1994). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The original four Asian Tigers refer to Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, whose 
economies grew exceptionally fast between the 1960s and the 1990s.  
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Shortly after that, in 1997, immediate outflows of foreign capital, preceded by a loss of 
export competitiveness, turned prosperity into slump. Massive outflows of foreign capital 
led to a run on the foreign reserves of the Bank of Thailand due to its attempt to fix the 
value of the Thai baht to the US dollar. The decision to switch from the fixed to the 
flexible exchange rate system caused a collapse of the baht’s value. A severe balance-of-
payments crisis erupted and then spread to other countries in the region, namely, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea. A loan package from the IMF was given 
to the country, and some restricted policy conditions designated by the IMF were also 
applied to limit prospective flawed policies. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the IMF’s 
policies and the exact time of recovery from the crisis were still unclear (Sussangkarn 
1999). After the crisis, exports have remained a dominant engine for the Thai economy, 
while foreign capital has been considered as an important factor of job creation and 
technological development. In spite of suffering from the crisis due to economic 
openness in the late 1990s, the country has never shunted away from economic liberalism, 
but, instead, economic policies under the guideline of neoliberalism were installed at a 
higher degree (Hewison 2003). However, economic growth has never reached its peak 
rate occurring prior to the crisis. In fact, being more exposed to the world economy, 
Thailand could be more vulnerable to suffer from the current global crises 
(Cheewatrakoolpong and Manprasert 2010). The tale of the fifth Tiger has ended, and the 
country has had to struggle in the fragile world of capitalism.  	   The development of the Thai economy has attracted interests from many scholars. 
Some notable works on the historical development of the Thai economy since the period 
of industrialization in the 1970s can be referred to as follows. Some grand books can be 
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reviewed as follows. The work of Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996) and that of Muscat 
(1994) were two grand pieces emphasizing the roles of macroeconomic policies on the 
Thai economic boom.  Similarly concluding that national economic policies were very 
important to economic prosperity in the late 1980s to the early 1990s, these two books, 
nevertheless, have different methodologies to approach the same end. The former 
observed several fields of macroeconomics policies, e.g., fiscal policy, monetary policy, 
and exchange rate policy, and use some advanced tools in economic analysis to appraise 
the impacts of the policies on economic growth. Meanwhile, the latter emphasizes the 
historical development of economic and political struggles that led to the advents of the 
successful policy setting. Studies of economic history by Phongpaichit and Baker (1998, 
2002) provided some alternative views to explain the boom and bust of the Thai economy. 
Beside influences from policies; cultural structures, such as the Chinese cultures on doing 
business; the trend of the upland labor force to migrate to the city; and political structures, 
such as the relations between business groups and military leaders, are considered as 
significant factors causing fluctuations of the economy. Written in the middle of the crisis, 
Dixon’s (1999) work argued that the prosperous Thai economy was built upon several 
problems which paved the way to the crisis in the late 1990s. Surrounded by many minor 
problems, underdevelopment in the agricultural sector, uneven income distribution, and 
uneven development between rural and urban areas are major problems of the Thai 
economy prior to the crisis. Observing several sectors of production, Doner (2009) 
argued that the Thai economy has been able to diversify their production but unable to 
upgrade productiveness of these economic activities, so Thailand has been stuck in the 
middle-income trap. This half-way economic transition from a low-income country to a 
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high-income country is a result of unstable politics which unevenly facilitates 
development of some sectors and neglected that of other sectors. 
Even though these great works cover many aspects to explain the Thai economy, 
there have still been a relatively limited number of literature using the Marxian or Post-
Keynesian approach to understand the Thai economy. In addition, existing works on 
these alternative approaches do not only emphasize the period of industrialization. 
Among many of his articles, Hewison’s book (1989) observed the Thai economy from 
the middle of the nineteenth century to the early 1980s, and finds that the economy 
rapidly developed in a capitalist fashion. In his analysis, he sees the Thai economy as 
composed of four principal fractions – agrarian, commercial, industrial, and banking – 
whose relationships drove the development of the Thai economy. In particular, he sees 
that the banking fraction was the most dominant fraction which could smoothly link its 
interests to the state, and led the economy to grow with a high degree of economic and 
social prejudices. Glassman (2004) was the latest author employing a Marxian method to 
understand the Thai economy after the period of industrialization. In his work, the Thai 
economy was developed under the hegemonic power of the US cold-war regime and the 
quasi-hegemony of the Japanese businesses. In spite of fast economic growth, the 
prosperity was paid for by the toil of the working class. In addition, the Thai rate of profit 
is measured and used to explain the economic crisis of 1997-98.  
This dissertation is aimed at complementing these previous works by providing 
alternative views to explain the development of the Thai economy. For all studies of the 
Thai economic development, beside the real growth rate of GDP, there is no other 
alternative indicator that tells the health of the Thai economy. In Marxian economics, the 
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rate of profit is one of the key variables not only telling the health of an economy but also 
playing a role as an incentive for capitalist accumulation. Thereby, the Thai rate of profit 
can stand as a distinguished alternative indicator to understand the health of the Thai 
economy. In addition, a clear knowledge of the Thai rate of profit can certainly lead to a 
deeper understanding of the economic development of Thailand. Because 
industrialization has been a key to economic fluctuations since the 1970s while the role of 
the traditional farming sector has faded, the nonfarm rate of profit from 1970 can be 
considered as an appropriate variable for the Thai economy.  
Meanwhile, in Post-Keynesian literature, the balance-of-payments-constrained 
growth model (the original Thirlwall’s law) (Thirlwall 1979) is a prominent demand-led 
growth model which emphasizes the importance of exports and a country’s balance of 
payments. Shortly after the advent of the original model, Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) 
developed the extended version of the balance-of-payments-constrained growth model 
(the extended Thirlwall’s law) by adding the role of the capital account on the balance of 
payments; in particular, they took into account the ability of capital flows to relax the 
balance of payments that could constrain economic growth. As stated above, because the 
Thai economy has relied on exports and capital inflows and its crisis was due to declines 
of exports and outflows of foreign capital, economic development of the country has 
likely been constrained by the balance of payments. Hence, the extended Thirlwall’s law 
is going to be a main tool to understand the Thai economy from the Post-Keynesian 
perspective.  
In the extended Thirlwall’s law, economic growth is a function of the growth rate 
of capital inflows. On the other hand, Marxian economists believe that capital can move 
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between sectors and regions in in order to seek higher profit rates, i.e., capital tends to 
move from sectors or regions with lower profit rates to those with higher profit rates. This 
dissertation may be considered as a hybrid version of Post-Keynesian and Marxian 
approaches to understand the Thai economic development via the model constructed in 
Chapter 2. 
Throughout the history of economic thought, economists have debated whether or 
not the balance of payments has impact on a country’s economic growth, but how the rate 
of profit plays a role in the balance of payments has been barely studied. The first essay 
(Chapter 2) is aimed at filling this gap and emphasizing the importance of the rate of 
profit on the balance of payments by presenting the model of economic development in 
which the rate of profit and the extended Thirlwall’s law interact. The chapter, at the 
beginning, shows that the economic growth rate defined by the original Thirlwall’s law is 
the equilibrium growth rate acting as a center of gravity around which the actual growth 
rate circulates, while the extended Thirlwall’s law allows relaxation of some important 
assumptions, especially the assumption of current account balance. The fundamental idea 
on which the model is based is that, in Marxian economics, the rate of profit is the most 
important determinant of capital accumulation, so capital has a tendency to move from a 
country with a lower rate of profit to that with a higher rate of profit. Therefore, a country 
that can run chronic current account deficits and use foreign capital to relax the balance-
of-payments constraint is likely to have a higher rate of profit than the average global rate 
of profit. However, increasing concentration of capital in the country leads to the 
increasing organic composition of capital that is the main reason of falling rate of profit 
in Marx’s original argument. As a consequence, the country’s rate of profit falls and 
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tends to converge to the global rate of profit, so the country becomes less attractive to 
foreign capital. That is, foreign capital plays a smaller role in relaxing the balance of 
payments and hence, they have a smaller impact on economic growth.  
Additionally, since the model in Chapter 2 can tell the dynamic interaction 
between the balance-of-payments growth rate and the rate of profit, it is possible that a 
country’s rate of profit drops lower than the global profit rate. A massive amount of 
foreign capital can flow away from a country and trigger a balance-of-payments crisis. 
That is, the model can incorporate Marx’s argument of the falling rate of profit to explain 
a balance of payment crisis. 
In the next steps, the dissertation is developed to empirically apply the model in 
Chapter 2 to explain the Thai economy. The second essay (Chapter 3) is aimed to 
measure the nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand from 1970 to 2010 by carefully looking at 
the National Income of Thailand issued by the National Economic and Social Board 
(NESDB). The result shows that the nonfarm profit rate continually fluctuates.  
Following the methodology presented by Dumenil and Levy (2004a: 22-23), the chapter 
decomposes the nonfarm profit rate to see its determinants – the nonfarm profit share (π), 
the nonfarm output-capital ratio (u), the nonfarm rate of surplus value (s), and the 
nonfarm organic composition of capital (c). The results show that the output-capital ratio 
and the organic composition of capital have been the main factors determining the trends 
of the nonfarm profit rate in Thailand, while profit share and the rate of surplus value 
have had smaller influences. The understanding of the nonfarm profit rate and its 
determinants reveal some details that leads to a better understanding of the development 
of the Thai economy. 
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The third essay (Chapter 4) employs a time-series analysis to provide empirical 
support for the model in Chapter 2. The chapter is divided into two parts. For the first 
part, in order to test whether Thirlwall’s law and the extended Thirlwall’s law can predict 
the growth rate of the Thai economy or not, the chapter starts with the measurement of 
the income elasticity of imports, and this elasticity is later used to calculate the predicted 
growth rates. The results suggest that both the original and the extended Thirlwall’s law 
can explain the growth of the Thai economy from 1980 to 2010. However, in deeper 
details, the extended model is better than the original model, as it can predict growth rates 
more accurately. The second part of this chapter attempts to show that, for the case of 
Thailand, growth rate of capital flows is determined by the nonfarm profit rate. The 
chapter uses an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bound testing approach to find 
short-run and long-run impact of the nonfarm rate of profit on growth rate of capital 
flows. The results present that the nonfarm rate of profit has impact on growth rate of 
capital flows in the long run, but growth rate of capital flows do not have long-run impact 
on itself. In the short run, the results are reversed. Lags of growth rates of capital flows 
have significant impact on itself, while the nonfarm profit rate has no impact. This 
finding is compatible with the nature of the extended Thirlwall’s law and it supports the 
hypothesis that profit rate determines mobility of capital.  
Lastly, Chapter 5 is not only the conclusion of the dissertation but it also provides 
empirical supports to ensure that the theoretical mode in Chapter 2 can explain the 
development of the Thai economy. The nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand and estimated 
GDP level generated from the extended Thirlwall’s law are put together in the same 
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diagram to see whether or not the interactions between the two variables are the same as 




















THE RATE OF PROFIT AND BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS-              
CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH:                                                                




Marxists consider that the rate of profit to be one of the most important concepts 
in the study of economics, because it acts as a determinant of the health of the economy, 
a criterion of technical changes, a factor of accumulation and growth, and a basis of 
distribution (Dumenil and Levy 1993). On the other hand, throughout the history of 
economic thought, economists have debated whether or not the balance of payments has 
impact on a country’s economic growth. However, there have been few studies on how 
the rate of profit interacts with the balance of payments to determine economic growth. 
For example, Szymanski (1974) took the idea of Marx and classical Marxists, such as 
Lenin and Luxembourg, in which the rate of profit is the main determinant of 
international capital mobility, and analyzed impact of US capital outflows on the US 
balance-of-payments crisis. This analysis is applicable to merely the case of a developed 
country, while the case of a developing country is not mentioned. In the case of a 
developing country, Shaikh2 (1980) argued at the beginning of his article that the rate of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In his analysis, foreign investments create both positive and negative impacts on a country’s 
balance of payments. On the positive side, foreign investments can create large-scale modern 
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profit attracts foreign investments, and capital flows from developed countries where 
profit rate is lower to developing countries where profit rate is greater. These two 
Marxian works, though providing insightful arguments on foreign capital on the balance 
of payments and considering the rate of profit as a main determinant of capital mobility, 
did not directly address impact of the rate of profit on the balance of payments.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to fill this gap by attempting to find direct 
impact of the rate of profit in the balance of payments. This chapter adopts the balance-
of-payments-constrained growth model (the original and the extended Thirlwall’s law) in 
which relaxation of the balance-of-payments constraint leads to higher economic growth, 
and argues that capital flows, which are one of the main factors governing the balance-of-
payments constraint, are determined by the rate of profit. In turn, changes of economic 
growth resulting from capital flows also have impact on the rate of profit. That is, in 
particular, this chapter develops a dynamic model showing the interaction between the 
rate of profit and the level of GDP. To a further extent, this chapter can expand the 
Marxian crisis theory by arguing that the falling rate of profit can cause the balance-of-
payments crisis. Moreover, it can also show some conditions of the original Thirlwall’s 
law to be able to yield the economic growth rule for a country constrained by its balance 
of payments. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
industries. Meanwhile, they also eliminate weak firms in backward industries, so all firms in 
backward industries that can survive from the wave of foreign capital must be very competitive in 
the world market. These dual-track developments can strengthen a developing country’s export 
sector, and improve its balance of payments. On the other hand, on the negative side, these 
foreign investments may act as a “powerful blocking mechanism” which obstructs development 
of “indigenous forces of production.” This effect lowers prices of indigenous commodities, and 
hence lowers a developing country’s term of trade which jeopardizes a country’s balance of 
payments. However, when he reaches the point where foreign direct investments can affect the 
balance of payments, the role of the rate of profit disappears. 
	  	  	  
12	  
2.2 The Original and the Extended Thirlwall’s Law 
 
The original Thirlwall’s balance-of-payments-constrained growth model is 
successfully created in his 1979 paper. The law is created by assuming that a country has 
current accounts in balance, so 
 𝑃𝑋 = 𝑃!𝑀         (2.1) 
 
 
where 𝑋 is the real value of exports and 𝑀 is the real value of imports, 𝑃 is the domestic 
price of exports, and 𝑃! is the foreign price of imports in domestic currency. The general 
multiplicative function of exports and that of imports which are used to derive the law are 
 
  X =  P!! ! Z!        (2.2) 
 
 
M =  Pf
P
ϕ
Yη         (2.3) 
 
 
where 𝑌 is domestic income, 𝑍 is global income,  𝜃 is the price elasticity of demand for 
exports, 𝜑 is the income elasticity of demand for imports, 𝜙 is the price elasticity of 
demand for imports, and 𝜂 is the income elasticity of demand for imports.  
Taking the rate of change of equation (2.2) and that of equation (2.3) and 
substituting them into the rate of change of equation (2.1) simply yields the original 
Thirlwall’s law. The parsimonious form of the law is as simple as 
 𝑦! =   !"!           (2.4) 
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By definition, the product of the income elasticity of demand for imports and the real 
growth rate of world income (𝑧) should be equal to the real growth rate of exports (𝑥), so 𝜑𝑧 = 𝑥. Hence, 
 
  𝑦! =    !!         (2.5) 
 
 
where 𝑦!  is an estimated economic growth rate. In order to derive this law, some 
requirements, especially the assumption of current account balance (equation (2.1)), are 
indispensable, so 𝑦!  is generally considered as the equilibrium growth rate of an 
economy (Setterfield 2011). Following Abu-Ismail (2006), I can show that equation (2.5) 
yields the equilibrium growth rate by looking at the identity 
 
 𝐼 − 𝑆 + 𝐺 − 𝑇 + 𝑋 −𝑀 = 0      (2.6) 
 
 
where  𝐼 is private investment, 𝑆 is private saving, 𝐺 is government spending, and 𝑇 is tax 
revenues; all variables are in real values. Assuming that  
 
 𝐼 − 𝑆 + 𝐺 − 𝑇 = 0       (2.7) 
 
 
Due to the assumption in equation (2.7), it can be derived that  
 
 
 𝑋 = 𝑀          (2.8) 
 
 
 Taking the rate of change of equation (2.8) yields 
 
 
 𝑥 = 𝑚          (2.9) 
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where 𝑚 is the growth rate of real imports. Without considering the price effects, the 
value of real imports (M) can be expressed as a function of real domestic income (Y) 
 
 𝑀 =   𝑌!         (2.10) 
 
 
Taking the rates of change of (2.10) and substituting into (2.9) yields 
 
 
 𝑥 = 𝜂𝑦         (2.11) 
 
 
Hence, equation (2.11) can be expressed exactly the same as equation (2.5). 
 From the above exercise, in order for the original Thirlwall’s law (equation (2.5)) 
to exactly tell actual economic growth rate, some other requirements must be satisfied. 
The first one is from equation (2.7) in which domestic spending from investments and 
government spending (I and G) must be internally financed by domestic tax revenues and 
domestic saving (T and S). To state it in another way, positive (negative) net government 
saving 𝑇 − 𝐺  must be offset by negative (positive) net private saving 𝑆 − 𝐼 . To 
further simplify the model, Thirlwall (1979) explicitly assumed two price-related 
conditions. The first one is that the sum of the price elasticity of demand for imports and 
the price elasticity of demand for exports must be equal to 1, so any change in exchange 
rate does not change the current account balance. The second price-related condition 
regards the constant term of trade so that relative prices in a common currency must stay 
constant. Since relative prices are constant, equation (2.1) can be simplified to equation 
(2.8). 
Since these requirements are not likely to be simultaneously met in the real world, 
the actual rate of economic growth is likely to deviate from the equilibrium growth rate. 
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In the empirical part of his article (1979) where the original Thirlwall’s law was initiated, 
Thirlwall explained that actual growth rate generally deviates from the equilibrium rate, 
because most countries always have imbalances of current accounts. 
The requirement of current account balance yields another property of the original 
Thirlwall’s law; the expansion of national income due to export growth must be offset by 
increasing imports in order to maintain the external balance. A country can grow not 
because of its ability to generate trade surplus but because of growing trade values via 
export demands. That is, growing exports allow higher income which must be used to 
increase imports and keep current accounts in balance. Therefore, according to equation 
(2.4), the equilibrium growth rate of one country is a result of the growth rate of the 
global income, and all countries can have economic growth simultaneously without 
having a problem of fallacy of composition (McCombie and Roberts 2002: 106-108, 
Setterfield 2011). Thirlwall (1986) argued that the fundamental idea that exports depend 
on world income, which is a demand side idea, differentiates the balance-of-payments-
constrained growth model from a neoclassical model, where exports are considered as a 
matter of increasing productivity and other domestic supply constraints. 
Because the original Thirlwall’s law argues that economic growth rate is driven 
by global demand for exports, it has been questioned that supply constraints in a country 
may not be able to fully adjust to meet the global demand. That is, it is possible that the 
growth rate from the demand side, which is derived from the original Thirlwall’s law, 
may not be equivalent to the growth rate of potential output, which is a function of labor 
force growth and productivity. The deficient capacity, if the growth rate from the demand 
side is greater, or the excess capacity, if the growth rate from the supply side is greater, 
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may lead to internal imbalances in a domestic level, thereby ruining the ability to explain 
economic growth of the original Thirlwall’s law. As shown by Palley (2002: 120), the 
condition that the original Thirlwall’s law can be the equilibrium by being equal to the 
potential output growth rate can be derived from the following additional equations.  
 𝜆 = 𝑑! + 𝑑!𝑦!        (2.12) 
 
 𝜆 is the growth rate of labor productivity. Equation (2.12) is the expression of Verdoorn’s 
law that increasing output growth from the demand side – 𝑦! – leads to increasing labor 
productivity. 
 
 𝑦! = 𝜆 + 𝑛         (2.13) 
 
 𝑦! is the growth rate of potential output, which is the natural growth rate defined 
from the supply side  and acts as the supply constraint of an economy. Equation (2.13), 
by definition, says that the growth rate of potential output (𝑦!) is the sum of the growth 
rate of labor productivity  (𝜆) and the growth rate of labor force  (𝑛). Substituting equation 
(2.12) into equation (2.13) yields 
 
 𝑦! = 𝑑! + 𝑑!𝑦! + 𝑛        (2.14) 
 
 
At the equilibrium where economic growth from the demand side is equal to that from 
the supply side, 𝑦! = 𝑦!. Hence, equation (2.14) can be rearranged as  
 
 𝑦! = !!!!!!!!          (2.15) 
 
 
Substituting equation (2.5) into equation (2.14) becomes 
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 𝑥 = !!!!!!!! 𝜂         (2.16) 
 
 
Equation (2.16) is the condition that the balance-of-payments-constrained growth rate is 
equal to the natural growth rate. However, this condition seems to take place very rarely. 
That is, if 𝑥 > !!!!!!!! 𝜂, there will be excess demand and overuse of capacity. Meanwhile, 
if 𝑥 < !!!!!!!! 𝜂, there will be excess supply and underuse of capacity. 
 There are several solutions for this problem. Palley (2002: 121-123) suggested 
that the income elasticity of imports (𝜂) could be expressed as a function of the rate of 
employment. When excess demand keeps growing, bottlenecks of domestic production 
emerge, so people demand more products from abroad. As a result, 𝜂 increases until the 
condition in equation (2.13) is met. Setterfield (2006, 2011) argued that Palley’s solution 
was “semi supply-determined growth” where the balance-of-payments-constrained 
growth rate adjusts to meet the supply constraints. He, instead, suggested that it is 𝑑!, the 
Verdoorn’s law coefficient, that is going to change in response to excess demand, and 
adjust the supply constraints to meet the condition in equation (2.16). Differently, Pugno 
(1998) created his “open Goodwin model,” where conflicts between classes affect 
inflation which further affect competitiveness to export and hence income. His finding is 
that, in the long run, the labor supply constraint never exists because the mobility of labor, 
e.g. migrations of workers, can adjust growth rate of labor force growth to meet the 
excess demand. That is, Pugno suggested that it is 𝑛 that adjusts, so equation (2.16) is 
satisfied. Regardless of their approaches, all authors believed that the external 
equilibrium (current accounts in balance) and the internal equilibrium (𝑦! = 𝑦!) can be 
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reached simultaneously. Therefore, the demand for exports via the original Thirlwall’s 
law determines the supply constraints in a country. 
Shortly after the advent of the original law, Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) 
observed that some developing countries encountered a foreign exchange bottleneck due 
to slow export growth, but they could grow rapidly while having current account deficits. 
This was because a massive amount of foreign capital flows into those countries to relax 
their balance of payments. From this fact, they extend the original Thirlwall’s law by 
allowing current account imbalances and taking into account the effects of foreign capital 
on the balance of payments. The new model (the extended Thirlwall’s law) is  
 
 𝑦!! =   ! ! !(!!!) !!         (2.17) 
 
 
where 𝑦!!  is an estimated economic growth rate, and 𝑐  is a real growth rate of foreign 
capital inflows. Total receipts of foreign currency (R) are equal to the sum of export 
volume (E) and the volume of net capital flows (C). Hence, 𝜔 = !! is the share of nominal 
exports in total receipts and 1− 𝜔 = !! is the share of nominal capital flows in total 
receipts. The major difference of the extended model is that it relaxes the constraint of 
external balance and allows the system to initially start at the ‘disequilibrium’ of the 
current account. Meanwhile, two price-related conditions, applied in the derivation of the 
original Thirlwall’s law, still hold in order to simplify the model.  
The origin of the model is hence from  
 
 𝑃𝑋 + 𝐶 = 𝑃!𝑀     
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where 𝐶, if positive (negative), is the net volume of capital inflows (outflows). The price-
related conditions still hold, so 𝑃 and 𝑃!  can be considered identical. Therefore, the 
equation can be simplified as 
 𝑋 + 𝐶 = 𝑀         (2.18) 
 
 
Since, according to equation (2.3), 𝑀 is a positive function of income (𝑌), I can now 
distinguish between 𝑌!, the real value of domestic income that satisfies equation (2.8), 
and 𝑌!! , the real value of domestic income that satisfies equation (2.18). In this regard, 
assume that 𝑋 is equal in both equation (2.8) and equation (2.18); hence, 𝑌!! > 𝑌! if a 
country has a current account deficit, while 𝑌!! < 𝑌! if a country has a current account 
surplus. 
Since one major requirement – the current account in balance – is relaxed, 𝑦!! , 
expected by Thirlwall and Hussain (1982), should be closer to the actual growth rate than 𝑦!. However, McCombie and Roberts (2002: 93 – 96) quantitatively showed that the 
difference between 𝑦!!  and 𝑦! should be very small, and the effect of foreign capital 
inflows, though important in the short or medium run, is negligible in the long run. That 
is, 𝑦!  and the original Thirlwall’s law act as a better estimator for the long-run 
equilibrium growth rate. Setterfield (2011) later proved the “durability” of the original 
Thirlwall’s law by assuming the “scarcely plausible” case that capital flows becomes 
more and more important until all foreign exchange comes from foreign capital inflows. 
According to Thirlwall (2011), “one of the weaknesses of the above model, 
however, is that it places no limit on the level of current account deficits financed by 
capital inflows and therefore on a country’s level of indebtedness relative to GDP.” 
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Coming out before Thirlwall’s statement, Moreno-Brid (1998) took this problem into 
consideration and derived a new specification of the law with the main assumption that 
the ratio of current account deficit to GDP must be stable in the long run. His finding was 
that whether or not the balance of payments can constrain economic growth depends on 
the initial export to total receipts ratio (𝜔) and the level of income elasticity of imports. 
Barbosa-Filho (2002) criticized Moreno-Brid’s article by arguing that the initial export-
import ratio is a function of economic growth, so the assumption of the long-run stable 
export-import ratio may be jeopardized. To solve this problem, Barbosa-Filho used phase 
diagrams to find the conditions of having a stable export-import ratio, and then 
mathematically showed that the only way to have the stable export-import ratio is to have 
an income elasticity of demand for imports that is equal to one. To remove this restriction, 
Barbosa-Filho included price changes and used an export-GDP ratio and import-GDP 
ratio as new unbalanced-trade constraints. Therefore, both price elasticity of demands for 
imports and income elasticity of demand for imports determine the conditions of constant 
current account deficits to GDP ratio. Both derivations are fundamentally based on 
Moreno-Brid’s observation that the ability to attract inflows of foreign capital depend on 
the current account deficits to GDP ratio and the foreign debt to GDP ratio. The higher 
the two ratios, the lower the inflows of foreign capital. Still, this argument is somewhat 
incomplete, as both authors ignore the reasons of why the ratios approach their certain 
limitations. In fact, there must be a determinant of capital inflows and the existences of 
these limitations are subject to these determinants. Both Moreno-Brid and Barbosa-Filho 
assumed that increasing economic growth leads to higher imports and hence higher trade 
deficits, and these deficits are automatically financed by capital inflows. This assumption 
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is more or less in conflict with the premise of the balance-of-payments-constrained 
growth model which requires capital to relax the balance-of-payments constraint and 
allow a country to stay in deficit. This reasoning, if correct, further enhances the 
importance of understanding the determinant of foreign capital inflows. From the 
Marxian perspective, this determinant is likely to be the rate of profit. Accordingly, 
Moreno-Brid’s and Barbosa-Filho’s specifications can be improved by considering 
capital flows as a function of the profit rate.  
In a Marxian tradition, the rate of profit is the main determinant of capital 
accumulation and investments. In a country, capital has a tendency to move from 
branches of production with lower profit rates to those with higher profit rates. The 
higher concentration of capital in a branch where capital moves into then leads to the 
higher organic composition of capital and the lower rate of profit. Due to the nature of 
capital to seek for a higher rate of profit, profit rates among sectors tend to converge to 
the general rate of profit. Marx (1991: 242) intentionally omitted a discussion on the 
different national levels of profit rates, but maintained that the concept of intersectoral 
variations of profit rates among domestic sectors in a country can be applied to explain 
international variations of profit rates among countries as well. Therefore, capital tends to 
move from a country with a lower profit rate to that with a higher profit rate, and, 
according to Szymanski (1974), this is the principle that the classical Marxists – namely, 
Lenin and Luxembourg – adopted and used in their further analyses. This argument 
further implies that a country’s rate of profit tends to converge to the global rate of profit, 
and, as soon as the domestic profit rate is equal to the global rate, ceteris paribus, capital 
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neither flows in nor flows out of the country.3 In this chapter, this idea is fundamental; 
the rate of profit is the main determinant of capital inflows, while, in the meantime, the 
inflows of capital tend to increase the organic composition of capital which reduces the 
rate of profit. That is, there is a dynamic interaction between the profit rate and capital 
inflows, and, as observed by Thirlwall and Hussain (1982), these inflows of capital 
determine economic growth of a country by relaxing the balance-of-payments constraint. 
Meanwhile, the falling rate of profit can cause outflows of capital, and hence cause a 
balance-of-payments crisis.  
 
2.3 The Model 
 
Because the rate of profit determines capital flows and capital flows also cause 
changes in the rate of profit, the purpose of this section is to create a model describing the 
dynamic interaction between 𝑌!!  and 𝑟 . That is, changes of 𝑌!!  and those of 𝑟  are 
determined by the level of both 𝑌!!  and 𝑟. The model is derived from two fundamental 
ideas. The first one is the extended Thirlwall’s law (equation (2.14)). The second is 
regarding the rate of profit that can be decomposed to be a function of the rate of surplus 
value and the organic composition of capital. The model is hence composed of two 
differential equations of 𝑌!!  and 𝑟, and it can be constructed as follows. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The contemporary phenomenon may be contradictory to what Marxists argue. If, presumably, 
profit rate differentials among the rich countries are small while the rate of profit in the poor 
regions are larger than the global rate of profit, the majority of capital should flow from the rich 
to the poor regions. However, the fact is just opposite.  The majority of international capital flows 
among countries occur among developed countries or some outstanding rising economies. 
Meanwhile, capital flows between rich countries and some less developed countries, such as poor 
parts of Africa and Asia, have been very small. According to Alfaro et. al. (2005), institutional 
quality, measuring the quality of informal and formal rules in an economy, and government 
policies on capital mobility are determinants of capital flows. These factors are significant but 
they are absent in the classical Marxian analysis on the relationship between international capital 
mobility and the rate of profit. 
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2.3.1. Y!!  
From equation (2.17), capital flows influence the balance of payments and 
determines 𝑦!! , which hence changes the value of 𝑌!! . Theoretically, the profit rate 
differential between a country’s profit rate and the global rate determines the direction of 
capital flows. The big gap between these rates cause flows of capital from a region whose 
profit rate is low to another region whose profit rate is high, while the equality of these 
two rates implies no mobility of capital. Therefore, if the domestic rate of profit is greater 
than the global rate of profit, leading to a positive gap between the two rates, capital must 
flow in to relax the balance of payments and yield a positive effect on 𝑌!! . In contrast, if 
the gap is negative, capital must flow out and cause a negative effect on 𝑌!! . In the context 
of equation (2.17), this implies that it is the profit rate differential that determines 𝑐 and 
hence 𝑦!! . 
Another factor that affects 𝑌!!  is a country’s position of the current account; that is, 
the differential between 𝑌!!  and 𝑌! . 4  To be complementary with the arguments by 
Moreno-Brid  (1998-99) and Barbosa-Filho (2002) who considered the case of a deficit 
country and observed that the ratio of debt to GDP approaches a certain rate, I can extend 
the arguments by saying that the ratio of capital flows (for both inflows and outflows) to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In general, it is argued that the country cannot have current account imbalance forever, and the 
current account has a tendency to converge to its balance due to the following reasons. If earning 
from exports is lower than spending for imports, economic growth tends to slow down in order to 
reduce imports. In contrast, if a country has a current account surplus, economic growth tends to 
accelerate generating more imports so the current account surplus tends to be eliminated. That is, 
there is an automatic mechanism for the current account to adjust to its equilibrium. This 
argument is contradictory with the fundamental argument of this paper, arguing that the rate of 
profit determines flows of capitals and hence determines the balance of payments. That is 
whether or not the current account can be in deficit depends on the level of the rate of profit. 
Therefore, current account disequilibrium does not have a mechanism to adjust to the equilibrium.  	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GDP should approach a certain level set by the rate of profit. In order to approach this 
ratio, export growth rate and import growth rate can be different, so 𝑦!!  may alter in order 
for the ratio of capital flows to GDP to approach that level. This argument implies that 
the growth rate of GDP is equal to that of capital flows. Assuming that the balance-of-
payments-constrained growth rate is equal to the actual growth rate: 
𝑐 = 𝑦 = 𝑦!!  = ! ! !(!!!) !!  
 
 
So, 𝑐 = 𝑦 =    ! !!!!!!        (2.19) 
 
 
Equation (2.19) is a simplified form of Moreno-Brid’s revised balance-of-payments-
constrained growth model in which the condition of the constant ratio of capital flows to 
GDP is satisfied. The important condition that this revised model can be rational is that 
the denominator,  𝜔 − 1+ 𝜂, must be greater than zero, in order to tell that an increasing 
growth rate of export leads to increasing economic growth. In addition, finding the rate of 
change of equation (2.10) and substituting into equation (2.19) give 
 
 𝑚 = !" !!!!!!         (2.20) 
 
 
Equation (2.20) describes the relationship between real growth rate of imports and 
that of export that can keep the ratio of capital flows to GDP constant. From equation 
(2.20), if !"!!!!!  is greater than 1, 𝑥  must be lower than 𝑚  in order to satisfy the 
condition  𝑐 = 𝑦. In contrast, if !"!!!!! is smaller than 1,  𝑥 must be greater than 𝑚 in order 
to satisfy the same condition. Lastly, if !"!!!!! is equal to 1,  𝑥 must be equal to 𝑚. The 
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value of !"!!!!!  depends on 𝜔 and 𝜂 . Since the value of 𝜔 tells whether the current 
account is in balance (𝜔 = 1), deficit (𝜔 < 1), or surplus (𝜔 > 1), the variable that 
really determines the value of !"!!!!! is 𝜂. 𝜂 = 1 is critical as it always makes !"!!!!! 
equal to 1, so 𝑥 and 𝑚 are always equal. The values of !"!!!!! depend on whether 𝜂 is 
inelastic or elastic (𝜂 < 1 or 𝜂 > 1) and also depend on whether the current account is in 
deficit or surplus (𝜔 < 1 or 𝜔 > 1). The results can be comprehended in Table 2.1. 𝑌!!  tends to converge to 𝑌! when  𝜂 > 1, so 𝑥 is greater than 𝑚 in a deficit period 
and 𝑥 is lower than 𝑚 in a surplus period. In other words, the current account has a 
tendency to return to the equilibrium. 𝑌!!  has its negative-own feedback to adjust to 𝑌! if 𝜂 is elastic. Meanwhile, if 𝜂 = 1, 𝑌!!  and 𝑌! stay parallel; that is, the disequilibrium of the 
current account does not have impact to adjust to its equilibrium. Lastly, if 𝜂 < 1, 𝑥 is 
lower than 𝑚 during a deficit period and 𝑥 is greater than 𝑚 during a surplus period. In 
other words, the current account tends to move away from its balance, and  𝑌!!  tends to 
diverge away from 𝑌!. 
 
Table 2.1 The Values of 𝝎𝜼𝝎!𝟏!𝜼 in the Different Cases of an Income Elasticity of 





 𝜔 = 1 (balance) 𝜔 > 1 (surplus) 𝜔 < 1 (deficit) 𝜂 = 1 (unitarily elastic) = 1 = 1 = 1 𝜂 > 1 (elastic) = 1 > 1 < 1 𝜂 < 1 (inelastic) = 1 < 1 > 1 
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 Based on this theoretical discussion, I propose a simple differential equation of 𝑌!! . 
In the specification, 𝑌!!  changes according to two factors. The first factor is the gap 
between 𝑌!! , in which the disequilibrium of the current account exists, and 𝑌!, in which 
the current account is in balance. The second factor is the gap between the domestic rate 
of profit and the global profit rate. The equation is as follows. 
 
 𝑌!! =    ∝! 𝑌!! −   𝑌! +  ∝! 𝑟 −   𝑟∗          (2.21) 
 
 
where ∝! is a coefficient whose sign depends on whether 𝜂 is elastic or inelastic. If 𝜂 is 
elastic (𝜂 > 1), ∝! is negative. If 𝜂  is inelastic (𝜂 < 1), ∝! is positive. And, if 𝜂  is 
unitarily elastic  (𝜂 = 1), ∝!is equal to zero. Meanwhile, ∝!  is a positive coefficient 
describing impact of the gap between the national rate of profit and the global rate of 
profit. High profit rate differential can attract foreign capital inflows that relax the 
balance of payments and hence generate higher growth. Since 𝑌! is determined purely by 
growth rate of exports which is generally understood as a function of world income, it is 
assumed exogenous and held constant in this analysis. Similarly, 𝑟∗ is the global rate of 
profit whose value cannot be altered by changes of a country’s profit rate, so it is also 
assumed to be exogenous.  
 
2.3.2 r 
 Meanwhile, 𝑌!!  and 𝑟 can lead to changes in the rate of profit as well. In order to 
understand how capital flows and current account disequilibrium can alter the rate of 
profit, I may start with a general decomposition of the rate of profit. In a wide range of 
literature on the decomposition analysis of the rate of profit (e.g. Weisskopf 1979, 
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Dumenil and Levy 2004), the way to see the components of the rate of profit is to 
decompose it as follows. 
 
 r = !! ∙ !!          (2.22) 
 
 
where Π is net profit, W is wage bills, and K is net fixed capital stock. 
 
The term !!  is similar to Marx’s definition of the rate of surplus value, which is 
a ratio of surplus value to total value of variable capital. It is generally argued that the 
change of this ratio depends on how tight the labor market is. That is, at the beginning of 
a growing period in which employment is still low, bargaining power of workers is 
deficient and real wage cannot increase as fast as labor productivity, so the rate of surplus 
value tends to increase. However, at one point in which the labor market turns tight and 
the number of workers in the reserve army of labor becomes low, workers have more 
power to bargain for higher wages in the labor market and real wage increases faster than 
labor productivity, so the rate of surplus value drops. Accordingly, there can be the 
equilibrium rate of surplus value which is determined by the capacity growth rate, and the 
economy can grow without departing from the equilibrium rate if the economic growth 
rate is exactly the same as the capacity growth rate. 
As it is already argued in the previous section (equation (2.12) – (2.16)), Post-
Keynesian economists believe that export demand determines capacity growth; that is 𝑦! 
determines 𝑦!. This means that 𝑦!is the growth rate that sets the equilibrium rate of 
surplus value. Not only does the differential of 𝑌!!  and 𝑌!  describe that the current 
account is not in balance, it also implies that economic growth does not stay on the track 
of the natural growth rate. That is, if 𝑌!!  is greater than 𝑌! and the current account is in 
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deficit, domestic production encounters bottlenecks of available resources and internal 
production capacity is unable to support the growing economy. This, thus, tightens the 
labor market and raises the bargaining power of workers. As a result, the rate of surplus 
value drops. In contrast, if 𝑌!!  is smaller than 𝑌! and the current account is in surplus, 
looseness of the labor market allows capitalists to have higher bargaining power to take 
more profit from total production. This leads to the increasing rate of surplus value. From 
these two opposite cases, since  𝑌! is considered exogenous and assumed to be constant, 𝑌!!  can be argued to have a negative relationship with profit rate. 
Meanwhile, The term !!  describes the ratio of total wages to capital stocks in 
the economy. This is similar to the inverse of Marx’s organic composition of capital 
which means the ratio of dead labors (machineries and raw materials) to living labors 
(wage-workers). In Marx, the organic composition of capital plays a very crucial role in 
the development of capitalism in which capitalists tend to replace living labors with dead 
labors, and this increasing organic composition of capital is the key factor of a tendency 
for the rate of profit to fall. For a country where foreign capital are influential to impact 
its domestic investment, large inflows of foreign capital tremendously increase domestic 
capital stock and hence its organic composition of capital. In the other way around, 
capital outflows reduce the amount of domestic capital stock and lower the organic 
composition of capital. Since a direction of capital flows is determined by a differential 
between the national rate of profit and the global rate of profit, positive differential has a 
power to attract capital inflows and lower the rate of profit, while negative differential 
causes capital flights and has a positive effect on profit rate. 
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Based on this theoretical discussion on profit rate decomposition, I can have a 
simple differential equation for the rate of profit which is a function of the gap between 
the output generated from the extended Thirlwall’s law (𝑌!!) and the equilibrium output 
generated from the original Thirlwall’s law (𝑌!) and that of the differential between the 
domestic rate of profit (𝑟) and the global rate of profit  (𝑟∗). The specification can be 
presented as follows. 
 
 𝑟 = −∝! 𝑌!! −   𝑌! −  ∝! 𝑟 − 𝑟∗       (2.23) 
 
 
where −∝! is a negative coefficient describing negative impact of tightness of a labor 
market on the rate of profit via changes in the profit share. As argued above, if 𝑌!!  is 
greater than 𝑌!, increasing tightness of the labor market leads to the lower rate of surplus 
value and the lower rate of profit. However, if 𝑌!!  is smaller than 𝑌!, the rate of surplus 
value tends to increase and the rate of profit is higher. Meanwhile, −∝! is a negative 
coefficient telling the speed of adjustment of the national level of profit rate towards the 
global rate of profit due to international mobility of capital that greatly impact a country’s 
organic composition of capital. 
 
2.3.3 The Systems of Y!!  and  r 
Two differential equations – equation (2.21) and (2.23) – are the core of the 
model because they yield a system of dynamic interaction between 𝑌!!  and 𝑟. The two 
differential equations yield two isoclines separating the phase plane into four isosectors. 
The point where the two isoclines intersect, which is the equilibrium of the system, is 
where the current account is in balance, 𝑌!! = 𝑌!, and the domestic rate of profit is equal 
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to the global rate of profit, 𝑟 = 𝑟∗. The Jacobian matrix of the system can be presented in 
its general form as follows. 
 
  𝐽 ≡ !!!!!!!! !!!!!"!!!!!! !!!! = ∝! +∝!−∝! −∝!  
 
 
The sign of the trace and that of the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are still 
unknown due to an ambiguous sign of ∝!. Since, as shown above, it is the value of 𝜂 that 
determines the sign and magnitude of ∝!, which further defines the characteristics of the 
system. Hence, all of the possible cases according to the value of  𝜂 can be presented as 
follows. 
 
1. Case 1:  η is elastic (η > 1) 
 Since 𝜂 > 1, it can be derived that ∝!< 0. In this case, the different signs of the 
off-diagonal parameters show a property of a clock-wisely cyclical adjustment. The 
isocline of 𝑌!!  is upward-sloping, while that of 𝑟  is downward-sloping. The system 
definitely yields a positive determinant and a negative trace of the Jacobian matrix. 
Hence, the system is stable and it shows the spiral cycle clock-wisely converging to the 
steady state which is where 𝑌!! = 𝑌! and 𝑟 = 𝑟∗. The phase diagram can be presented in 
Figure 2.1. 
2. Case 2: η is unitarily elastic (η = 1) 
A percentage change of income from inflows of capital leads to a higher 
percentage change of demand for import, so ∝!= 0 and the disequilibrium of the current 
       






















Figure 2.2: The Dynamic Interaction between 𝒀𝑩!  and  𝒓 for the Case of 𝜼 > 𝟏 
 
 
account does not have impact on 𝑌!! . As a result, the isocline of 𝑌!! = 0 is a horizontal 
line while that of 𝑟 is still downward-sloping. A negative trace and a positive determinant 
mean that the system is stable and it features convergence. Similar to Case 1, the system 
still moves in the form of a clock-wise spiral. The system of Case 2 can be presented in 
Figure 2.2. 
3. Case 3:  η is inelastic (η < 1) 
 An inelastic 𝜂 leads to a positive ∝!, because a percentage change of capital flows, 
leading to economic growth in a country, is followed by a lower percentage change of 
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Figure 2.2: The Dynamic Interaction between 𝒀𝑩!  and  𝒓 for the Case of 𝜼 = 𝟏 
 
 
imports. Therefore, the gap between 𝑌!!  and 𝑌! becomes wider. As a result, the isocline of 𝑌!! = 0 has a negative slope. The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix, whose 
value depends on the magnitude of ∝!, can be falling in one of three following cases.  
a) Case 3.1: the trace is negative and determinant is positive 
 
In this case, 𝜂 is not far below one, so ∝! is close to zero. That is, the current 
account disequilibrium does not play a big role to reduce the gap between 𝑌!!  and 𝑌!. The 
phase diagram shows that the system still features a clock-wise cyclical movement. A 
negative trace and a positive determinant guarantee that the model is stable at its steady 
𝑌!!̇ = 0	  
?̇? = 0	  
𝑌!! = 𝑌!	  
𝑟 = 𝑟∗	  	  
𝑌!! 	  
𝑟	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state. In addition, a negative trace also means that the absolute value of the positive ∝! is 
smaller than that of the negative ∝!. In other words, the mechanism of the current 
account to meet the constant ratio of capital flows to GDP has smaller impact compared 
to the impact from the rate of profit to set the position of the current account. As stated 
earlier, because ∝!, in general, is expected to be quite low, Figure 2.3 is the case that is 















Figure 2.3: The Dynamic Interaction between 𝒀𝑩!  and  𝒓 for the Case of 𝜼 < 𝟏,  
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b) Case 3.2: the trace and determinant are positive  
 
A low 𝜂 leads to a higher value of ∝!, so the trace becomes positive while, similar 
to the previous cases, the determinant is still positive. The system, hence, still features a 
clock-wise cycle, but it is divergent. Due to a positive trace, it means that the value of the 
positive ∝! is greater than the absolute value of the negative ∝!. That is, the mechanism 
of the current account to meet the constant ratio of capital flows to GDP has great impact 
on 𝑌!! , while capital flows do not have significantly big impact to increase the organic 
composition of capital and then reduce the rate of profit to the global rate. Hence, 
although the rate of profit has a tendency to converge to the global rate, it is actually the 
tendency to move away from the current account balance that drives the system to 













Figure 2.4: The Dynamic Interaction between 𝒀𝑩!  and  𝒓 for the Case of 𝜼 < 𝟏, 
Resulting in the Positive Trace and the Positive Determinant 
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This is likely to be the case of a newly open country whose organic composition 
of capital changes very slowly due to its abundant labor force and its focus on labor-
intensive industries. As a result, its rate of profit barely changes in spite of massive flows 
of foreign capital, contributing to a near-zero ∝!.  
c) Case 3.3: the determinant is negative 
A negative determinant emerges when the absolute value of the product of ∝! and ∝! is greater than that of ∝! and ∝!. That is, the negative isocline of 𝑌!! = 0 is steeper 
than that of 𝑟 = 0. Dissimilar to all of the previous cases, the negative determinant means 
that the solution of the system, where 𝑟 = 𝑟∗ and 𝑌!! = 𝑌!, is an unstable saddle point. As 
a result, the cycle no longer exists in this case.  This is because the parameters of the off-
diagonal variables,  ∝! and ∝!, do not have sufficient impact to drive the clock-wise cycle.  
To explain this, for the case of a deficit (surplus) country, the current account 
deficit cannot sufficiently reduce (increase) the rate of profit to the level in which 
outflows (inflows) of foreign capital can sufficiently reduce (increase) 𝑌!! . That is, the 
impact of the adjustment of the current account to reach the constant ratio of capital flows 
to GDP, which leads to a wider gap of 𝑌!!  and 𝑌! outstrips the impact of profit rate 
adjustment to close the gap between 𝑌!!  and 𝑌!. The steady state which is 𝑌!!  and 𝑟∗ is no 
longer the equilibrium around which the system circulates and it is a saddle point of the 
system. The system can be shown in Figure 2.5. This case is in conflict with the 
theoretical background of the model, because as, shown in phase 2 and phase 3 (phase 1 
and phase 4) of the figure, that a country can run a chronic current account deficit 
(surplus) although its rate of profit is lower (higher) than the global rate of profit.  
 










Figure 2.5: The Dynamic Interaction between 𝒀𝑩!  and  𝒓 for the Case of 𝜼 < 𝟏, 
Resulting in the Positive Trace and the Negative Determinant 
 
 
It is important to note that this model can explain an economy, if capital is 
allowed to flow in response to the rate of profit. That is, the economy should not have an 
intention to strictly control mobility of capital. To a further extent, it can be argued that a 
country employing foreign capital to expand its economy should have a high degree of 
interaction with the world economy, so its income elasticity of import is likely to be 
above one. In addition, due to the continuous expansion of international trades, all 
countries tend to have an elastic income elasticity of imports (𝜂 > 1). Consequently, 
among all cases, Case 1 is the most possible case.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Empirical measurements of income elasticities of imports also show that most countries have an 
elastic income elasticity of imports. For example, Lopez and Thirlwall (2006) measured 
individual income elasticities of imports for sixteen Latin American countries, and found that 
fourteen out of sixteen countries have an elastic income elasticity of imports. In addiion, the two 
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Case 3.2 and Case 3.3 could possibly happen only if 𝜂 is significantly lower than 
one and hence ∝! is significantly high. It is important to note that equation (2.19) is 
another form of the balance-of-payments-constrained growth model, and this revised 
form requires the condition that the term 𝜔 − 1+ 𝜂 must be positive. In other words, 𝜔 + 𝜂 must be greater than one in order for equation (2.19) to explain economic growth 
of an economy. Therefore, Case 3.2 and Case 3.3 are not likely to occur at its initial state, 
because the two conditions 𝜂 < 1  and 𝜔 + 𝜂 > 1  are contradictory to one another, 
especially during the deficit period when  𝜔 < 1. In addition, because these two unstable 
cases cause a larger gap between 𝑌!!  and 𝑌!, this implies that the fluctuations of 𝜔 are 
increasingly larger through time. Therefore, it is possible that at some point in time 
during the deficit period of the system, 𝜔 + 𝜂 may drop below one and equation (2.19) 
does not hold to explain the economy. Empirically, 𝜂 < 1 means that the ratio of imports 
to GDP of a countries should be falling through time, but this is irrelevant with the real 
world in which most countries have become more and more involved with international 
trade. Above all, as noted in the previous footnote, the current empirical research has 
revealed that most countries have elastic income elasticity of demand for imports. From 
this discussion, I can argue that Case 3.2 and Case 3.3 have low possibilities and they, 
though occurring, are not persistent because the dropping value of 𝜔 jeopardizes the 
condition 𝜔 + 𝜂 > 1, required in equation (2.19). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
inelastic income elasticities of imports of the two countries – Dominican Republic and Nicaragua 
– are not statistically significant. Bagnai (2010) measured income elasticities of imports of 22 
OECD countries by taking into account impacts of structural breaks. His finding shows that only 
Iceland, when structural break is not considered, has the inelastic income elasticity of 
imports  (𝜂 > 0.9). Yet, when taking into account the break year in 1989, the icelandic income 
elasticity of imports is elastic 𝜂 = 1.35  prior to the break year and became inelastic (𝜂 = 0.8) 
after the break year. Lastly, my finding in Chapter 4 shows that, for the case of Thailand, the 
income elasticity of imports from 1980 to 2010 is elastic as well (𝜂 = 1.64) 
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From the empirical and theoretical supports discussed above, only Case 1, Case 2, 
and Case 3.1 seem to be valid in a long run and to be realistic in the real world. These 
three share the same characteristics; that is 𝑌!!  and  𝑟 converge to the equilibrium. This 
means that the extended Thirlwall’s law cannot act as the long-run growth rule, and only 
the original Thirlwall’s law is the ultimate balance-of-payments-constrained growth 
model that yields the long-run equilibrium growth rate.  
 
2.3.4 Explaining the Cycles 
The behaviors of the systems shown in their phase diagrams are very useful to 
understand how 𝑌!!  and 𝑟 can drive business cycles. Because 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒  3.2 and 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒  3.3 are 
not likely to happen in reality, I am going to just discuss the phase diagrams of 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒  1, 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒  2, and 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒  3.1 that are more likely to happen in the real world. The four phases in 
the phase diagrams of the interaction between 𝑌!!  and 𝑟 can be discussed in detail as 
follows.  
Phase 1: This is the phase in which the rate of profit builds up. The increasing rate 
of profit attracts inflows of foreign capital to increase 𝑌!! . Meanwhile, since 𝑌!!  is smaller 
than 𝑌!, the labor market is not yet tight, so profit share has a tendency to increase, 
leading to the increasing rate of profit. Hence, more workers are brought into the 
production process while not many fixed capital stocks are constructed. That is, variable 
capital takes a leading role in general production. As a result, the organic composition of 
capital tends to drop, and this leads to the fast-increasing rate of profit. 
Phase 2: This is a boom phase where the rate of profit gradually drops but 𝑌!!  
increases enormously. This phase occurs after the rate of profit reaches its peak. A 
massive amount of foreign capital, which is attracted by very high profit rate, flows into 
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working as wage-workers in the nonfarm sector yielded them higher incomes than being 
self-employed in the farms. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that all unincorporated 
income in the farming sector should be considered as wage equivalents to self-employed 
farmers. The next issue is how to deal with nonfarm unincorporated income. Since most 
unincorporated enterprises are small and directly run by their owners, the owners obtain a 
part of income as profits and another part as wages for being self-employed. Following 
the method used in other profit-rate literature (e.g. Wolff 2001) and Izyumov and 
Alterman (2005)), I simply assume that a half of this income is profits, while another half 
is wages of being self-employed. Unincorporated profit is hence equal to a half of 
nonfarm unincirporated income. Hence, it is equal to a half of Others of Table 53 Income 
from Farms, Professions and Other of source 1.1, Others of Table 55 Income from Farms, 
Professions and Other Unincorporated Enterprises Received by Households of source 
1.2, and Others of Table 47 Households and NPISHs Mixed Income Receivable of source 
1.3. 
 The sum of these four categories is defined as total profit collected from the Thai 
National Income Accounts. This total profit, to be compatible with other data, should be 
divided into farm profit and nonfarm profit too.  
– Farm Profit (Πf) = Yf – total wages in the farming sector (Wf) 
Even though most farmers are self-employed and their incomes are considered as 
wages, there are still some capitalist corporations in the farming sector. Therefore, it is 
necessary to estimate farm profit to be deducted from the total corporate profit. 
Unfortunately, the data on farm profit are not available, so I use the following method. 
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composition of capital keeps dropping. Therefore, the rate of profit slightly increases. 
However, this level of the domestic rate of profit is still lower than the global rate of 
profit and hence, it is not sufficient to attract foreign capital, so 𝑌!!  still drops though the 
economy shows a sign of pickup via the increasing rate of profit.  
The phase diagram also suggests that the rate of profit and 𝑌!!  are most volatile 
during the first cycle. Then, the system gradually adjusts, so the rate of profit and 𝑌!!  
fluctuate less and less in the next cycles. This yields a marked insight that a country 
newly liberating its capital and money market in order to encourage foreign capital 
inflows to finance its economic growth may enjoy very fast economic growth only when 
the policy is newly launched. However, when the rate of profit drops below the global 
rate, rapid capital flights turn the economy into a slump due to the balance-of-payments 
crisis. Later, the economy may come back to growth, but the growth rate will never be as 




The intuitive idea behind this chapter’s model is built from Marx’s theory of 
profit rate equalization. In his idea, the nature of capital mobility is a pursuit of profits, so 
the rate of profit is the main determinant of capital flows and, hence, capital flows from a 
country with a lower rate of profit to that with a higher rate of profit. However, an 
increasing amount of foreign capital leads to the increasing organic composition of 
capital which directly lowers the rate of profit, so, in a host country, the rate of profit has 
a tendency to fall and converges to the equilibrium rate. The important point is that the 
mobility of capital has a large effect on a country’s balance of payments, especially in the 
case of countries encouraging foreign capital to finance their investments, and, according 
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to the extended Thirlwall’s law – equation (2.8) – growth rate of foreign capital flows 
determine the balance-of-payments-constrained growth rate. That is, the rate of profit has 
a dynamic interaction with the balance-of-payments-constrained growth rate. 
From this intuitive idea, I can construct the dynamic model of profit rate and the 
level of GDP generated by the extended Thirlwall’s law by using the idea of differential 
equations and phase diagram. The model presents that the parameters of both 
independent variables in the differential equations are important to determine the 
behaviors of the systems. However, it is likely that, in reality, the variables have a clock-
wise cyclical relationship between one another, and the system converges to its steady 
state, where the national rate of profit is equal to the global rate of profit and 𝑌!!  is equal 
to 𝑌!. The model contributes some theoretical insights to Marxian and Post-Keynesian 
literatures. First, different phases in the phase diagram imply that profit rate can 
determine business cycles, which is similar to the objectives of other Marxian works on 
the rate of profit and business cycles, such as, Hahnel and Sherman (1982) and Bakir and 
Campbell (2006, 2009), but this model suggests that the cycles are generated via 
fluctuations of the balance of payments. The model shows that a big boom is 
endogenously followed by a big slump. That is, business cycles in an economy, 
especially with free capital mobility, are endogenously embedded in the system due to the 
nature of foreign capital seeking for the high rate of profit. Second, a Marxian notion of 
the falling rate of profit resulting in an economic crisis is reaffirmed in the third phase of 
the model in which the rate of profit and 𝑌!!  sharply fall together. The newly developed 
insight on economic crisis derived from model is that the crisis is via the balance-of-
payments problem. Third, because this chapter argues that, due to empirical and 
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theoretical supplementary supports, only the cases containing a convergence property can 
exist in reality, the extended Thirlwall’s law can only temporarily explain economic 
growth. That is, the original Thirlwall’s law is the ultimate growth rule acting as a center 
of gravity of economic growth. This model, accompanying with other Post-Keynesian 
literatures (Pugno 1998, McCombie and Roberts 2002: 93 – 96, and Setterfield 2011), 
provide an alternative way to demonstrate the robustness of the original Thirlwall’s law 























 Since the rate of profit is one of the most important concepts in Marxian 
economics, there is no way that economic development of an economy can be fully 
explained without understanding the historical performance of its rate of profit. For the 
case of Thailand, in spite of many works explaining its economic development, the study 
of the Thai rate of profit and its role in the Thai economy has been limited.6 Since 
industrialization is an engine for modernization and economic prosperity in Thailand and 
industrial and service sectors are big absorbers for Thai workers, the nonfarm rate of 
profit in Thailand must yield a better understanding of the development of the Thai 
economy. This chapter is, hence, aimed to measure the nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand 
from 1970 to 2010. In addition, decompositions of the nonfarm rate of profit further yield 
valuable insights to understand some meaningful variables, such as the rate of surplus 
value and the organic composition of capital, that determine fluctuations of the nonfarm 
rate of profit.  
 To fulfill this task, this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 is the review 
of literature on profit rate measurement in a Marxian tradition for the case of Thailand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Glassman (2001 and 2004) is the only person who measures the rate of profit in Thailand. 
However, there are some shortcomings in both methodology and availability of data in his rate of 
profit rate measurement. More details on his measurement are discussed below in Section 3.2.3. 
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and that of other countries. Section 3.3 is my attempt to explain data collection and the 
methodologies to calculate the nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand. Section 3.4 shows the 
results and decomposes the nonfarm rate of profit to see its determinants. It also divides 
the nonfarm rate of profit into four phases, and calculates impact of each determinant on 
the nonfarm rate of profit in each phase. Section 3.5 shows how the nonfarm rate of profit 
and its determinants can reveal some hidden aspects of the Thai economy. Section 3.6 is 
the conclusion. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
The idea of the rate of profit was invented by Karl Marx (1991) who argued that 
in a capitalist economy, there is a tendency for a falling rate of profit. After Marx’s 
original work, the tendency for a falling rate of profit had been widely developed and 
criticized only in a theoretical level (Lenin 2008, Grossman 1992, Okishio 1961). 
However, empirical measurements of the rate of profit require a firm process of data 
collecting, so the first modern empirical work on the rate of profit came as late as the 
1970s by Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972) in the case of the UK. After that, in the early time of 
the empirical measurement of the rate of profit, the US rate of profit received a wider 
range of attention from Marxists, so most literature attempted to create some techniques 
to measure the US profit rate. Hence, there is more literature on the US rate of profit than 
those on other single country. Therefore, this part will start by briefly reviewing literature 
on the US rate of profit and be followed by those on profit rates in other countries. This 
part will end with a detailed review of Glassman’s works (2001, 2004), which are the 
only works measuring the rates of profit in Thailand. 
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3.2.1 The US Rates of Profit 
 The first empirical measurements of the US rates of profit came out in 1979. 
Wolff (1979) observed input-output tables, which at the time were available only for the 
years 1947, 1958, 1963, and 1967, and then he finds  “the labor value” of all commodities 
and uses this labor value to calculate the rate of profit in the USA from 1947 - 1967. The 
result is that the rate of profit tended to increase. However, he concludes that this 
increasing rate of profit, which is against Marx’s tendency of the falling rate of profit, 
was because labor productivity increased faster than real wages. With a different 
methodology, Weisskopf (1979) decomposed the rate of profit to see that its components 
are “the share of profits in income,” “the rate of capacity utilization,” and “the capacity-
capital ratio,” and, in respective response to these three components, “a rising strength of 
labor,” “a realization failure,” and “a rising organic composition of capital” are the 
sources of changes in the rate of profit. He acquired the data from the US National 
Income and Product Accounts to find the before-tax rate of profit for the entire non-
financial corporate business sector from 1949 to 1975 that could be divided into five 
cycles of the rate of profit. His finding was that the rate of profit tended to fall and the 
rising strength of labor was the main factor of the declining rate of profit, while the 
decline of capacity utilization also contributed to the falling rate, however at a lower 
degree. This article by Weisskopf is a milestone work on profit rate measurement, as it 
sets a standard methodology to measure the rate of profit for many following works, such 
as Hahnel and Sherman (1982) who found the relation between the rate of profit and the 
US business cycles, Michl (1988) who used a regression analysis to take into account the 
trend structure, and Hanley (1987) who found that the profit squeeze in the late 1970s and 
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the early 1980s was due to higher wages received by nonproductive workers. In his 2001 
and 2003 article, Wolff no longer employed the input-output matrix in order to measure 
the rate of profit, developed by himself in 1979. He, instead, used the data from the 
National Income and Product Account to calculate the US rate of profit. He found that the 
rising rate of profit since the early 1980s to 1997 was due to the rising profit share and 
the declining organic composition of capital. 
 The next breakthrough in profit rate literatures emerged when Moseley (1991) 
introduced a new way of measuring the rate of profit based on Marx’s distinction 
between productive and unproductive labor. The main conclusion in all of his works on 
the rate of profit (Moseley 1990, 1991, 1997) was that the most important factor leading 
to the falling rate of profit in the USA has been the increasing proportion of unproductive 
labor. His further analysis argued that this way of measuring the rate of profit is more 
consistent with the trend of the rate of profit than two types of profit squeeze presented 
by Weisskopf (1979) and Wolff (1986). 
 Later literature on the US rate of profit has become more advanced in terms of 
both methodology and data collecting. Dumenil and Levy’s Capital Resurgent (2004a) is 
a comprehensive book using several techniques to measure the rates of profit in the USA 
and France to explain the roots of the neoliberal revolution. Dumenil and Levy (2004b) 
invented a major breakthrough in the development of the literature on the rate of profit by 
seeing impact of the financial sector on the rate of profit. In the article, the authors 
succeeded in finding the rate of profit in the nonfinancial-corporate sector, that in the 
nonfinancial-corporate sector with impact of financial relations, and that in the financial 
sector. What they discovered is that the rise of neoliberalism in the USA significantly has 
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led to the increasing rate of profit in the financial sector, while financial incomes and 
burden of real interest rates have also affected the rate of profit in the nonfinancial sector. 
Following Dumenil and Levy (2004b), Bakir (2006) calculated the ‘augmented profit rate’ 
which is the rate of profit that takes into account impact of financial relations of the 
nonfinancial corporate businesses. He then compared the augmented profit rate with the 
after-tax profit rate and found that the nonfinancial corporate businesses paid a higher 
proportion of interests and dividends out of their pockets, and their financial investments 
could not yield sufficient income to offset higher dividends and interests. 
 
3.2.2 The Rates of Profit in Other Countries 
 
Empirical measurements of profit rates in other countries are not as advanced as 
those in the USA. Usually, profit rate literature calculates the rate of profit in a particular 
country, evaluates whether it has a tendency to fall or rise in each time period, and reports 
the dominant determinants of its tendency. Some selected examples of this literature are 
as follows.  
Henley (1989) calculated the rate of profit in the UK corporate sector from 1962 – 
1985 and found the falling trend of the profit rate mainly due to the lower profit share and 
the lower capital productivity, while the lower capacity utilization also contributed to 
push down the profit rate but at a moderate degree. Further, the sign of pick-up in the 
1980s was due to lower workers’ bargaining powers for higher wages. However, due to 
the absence of increasing productivity of labor and capital, there was no signal that the 
rate of profit could go back to its 1960s level. Brown and Mohun (2011) attempted to 
measure the profit rate in the UK during the interwar period (1920 – 1938), and found 
that there was a sharp rise of the rate of profit. The determinants of this rise in the 1920s 
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were different from those in the 1930s. In the 1920s, the rate of profit increased due to 
the increasing rate of surplus value and the falling organic composition of capital. In the 
1930s, a surge of labor productivity was the main reason behind the increasing rate of 
profit. 
Reati (1986) measured the rate of profit in West Germany from 1960 -1981 in 
order to test the law of the falling rate of profit. The result is that the rate of profit had a 
clear tendency of falling in all sectors, especially in the first half of the 1970s. However, 
this falling was not a result of the increasing organic composition of capital as stated in 
Marx’ original argument. Rather, it was the increasing wage share as demands for labor 
rapidly increased, so the smaller size of a reserve army of labor resulted in increasing real 
wages. In addition, Tutan and Campbell (2005) studied the rate of profit in West 
Germany from 1960 to the year of unification by dividing the economy into the 
manufacturing sector and a nonmanufacturing sector. They find that both rates fell from 
1960 to 1981 and then increased after that. Fluctuations of profit share in each sector 
were explained as a main engine of profit rate fluctuations. 
Lianos (1992) presented the rate of surplus value, the organic composition of 
capital, and the rate of profit in Greece’s manufacturing sector from 1960 -1983. He 
found that there was an increasing trend of the organic composition of capital, while the 
rate of surplus value and the rate of profit fluctuated and no apparent trend could be 
observed. A related article in 1993 by Lianos and Droucopoulos presented profit rate 
differentials of several industries in the Greek manufacturing sector from 1963 – 1986 in 
order to see whether or not the profit rates tended to converge in the long run. The result 
is that there is a moderate tendency of profit rate convergence, and the differentials 
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seemed to be bigger during a recession. Izyumov and Alterman (2005) used national 
income data to measure the rate of profit in Russia from the transition period in 1994 to 
2002. The rate of profit had two separate trends: the decrease from 1994 to 1997 and the 
increase from 1998 to 2002, where output – capital ratio contributed the most to this 
fluctuation while profit share remains stable. Izquierdo (2005) estimated the rate of profit 
in Spain from 1954 – 2001, and he found that the rate of profit had a downward trend in 
the long term while there were short-term cyclical movements along this trend. 
According to the decompositions, he saw that the rising organic composition of capital 
contributed to the downward trend, while the movements of the profit share determined 
the cyclical movements of the profit rate. 
Webber and Rigby (1986) evaluated the rate of profit in the Canadian 
manufacturing sector from 1950 to 1981. The authors used the idea based on Marx’s 
reproduction schema in order to construct their model of the rate of profit. It is found that 
there were endogenous forces that caused higher real wages and higher organic 
composition of capital. However, there were counteracting factors such as lower prices of 
production and an increasing rate of turnover of capital that had positive effects to the 
rate of profit. Still, empirical evidence revealed that the rate of profit kept falling 
throughout the time of observation. The paper concludes that the falling rate of profit is 
endogenous to capitalism. For further details, two pieces by Webber and Tonkin 
measured the rate of profit in the Canadian textile, knitting, and clothing industries 
(1988a), and that in the Canadian wood, furniture, and paper industries (1988b). 
In Mexico, due to a limitation of the Mexican data, Etelberto (2005) presented the 
profitability trend, which is estimated by the difference of the rate of growth of net 
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income per worker and wage rate and determines the moving direction of the rate of 
profit in the Mexican economy from 1970 - 2000. Further, he then divided the economy 
into six sectors, and found sectoral profitability trends. Marquetti, Filho, and Lautert 
(2010) presented the rate of profit in Brazil from 1953 to 2003. The rate of profit 
apparently showed a tendency of falling. To observe in more details, the authors divide 
the rate of profit into three phases: a moderate decline from 1953 to 1973, a sharp fall 
from 1973 to 1989, and a slight increase from 1989 to 2003. The profit rate 
decompositions further informed that the main factor behind the falling rate of profit was 
the declining productivity of capital. 
Some studies were conducted to see the profit rates in several countries. Li, Xiao, 
and Zhu (2007) studied the long-term fluctuations of the rate of profit in the UK, the 
USA, Japan, and the Euro-zone, and the authors successful found the long waves of the 
rates of profit. Further, not only did they find the national rates of profit, the authors also 
discover the ‘world profit rates’ and their long waves. This then allowed the authors to 
understand the behaviors of the global rate of profit during different stages of world 
capitalist development and different hegemonic powers. Zachariah (2009) calculated the 
rate of profit in the USA, Japan, the UK, France, Italy, Canada, Australia, and Sweden 
from the early 1960s to the late 1990s. He found that the profit rates in the USA, Japan, 
France, and Canada had a tendency of falling, while those of the rest did not fall. In 
addition, the author also introduced the concept of the equilibrium rate of profit, which 
depends on the growth rate of workforce, the average growth rate of productivity of labor, 
a fraction of the labor-value of the surplus product, and depreciation. This equilibrium 
rate acts as a long-run trend of the rate of profit in a particular country. Vaona (2010) 
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presented the rate of profit in Denmark, Finland, and Italy from the 1970s to 2007, and all 
of them did not show a falling trend. The author could draw insights from seeing 
common behaviors of determinants of the rate in each country; in the short run, 
fluctuations in the rate of profit were caused by, as Weisskopf (1979) found, a rising 
strength of labor and realization failures, while, in the long run, the trends of the rates 
were run by rising productivity of capital and a shift of employments to high-productivity 
sectors.  
 
3.2.3 The Thai Rate of Profit 
 
For the case of Thailand, two pieces by Glassman (2001 and 2004: 176 – 184) 
were the only works estimating the Thai rate of profit in a Marxian fashion. Both works 
calculated the rates of profit in a manufacturing sector and a nonmanufacturing sector 
from 1970, and used only the manufacturing profit rate in order to analyze the causes of 
the economic crisis in 1996 – 1997.7 In order to find the rate of profit, Glassman 
estimated the rate of profit from Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB)’s National Accounts; total profit in the manufacturing 
sector is equal to manufacturing value added minus compensation of manufacturing 
employees, while profit in the nonmanufacturing is hence equal to nonmanufacturing 
value added minus compensation of nonmanufacturing employees. Due to the lack of 
data at the time, the NESDB provided only the data for ‘gross’ fixed capital stock, but did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Using a non-Marxian method, Reynolds et al. (1999, 2001) also take into account the role of 
profitability in the Thai economy. Reynolds et al. (1999) use microlevel data in order to calculate 
the ratio of short-term debts to net profit of nonfinancial firms in several countries including 
Thailand, and find that taking excessive risks in microlevel data led to the Asian crisis. In their 
latter work (Reynolds et al. 2001), they compare the ratio of short-term debts to net profit in 
Asian countries with those of Latin American countries, they find that, prior to the crisis, the 
Asian countries took risks much higher than the Latin American countries. 
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not have the ‘net’ fixed capital stock. Since the rate of profit tells the profitability of the 
total capital that is currently in use, net fixed capital stock is the proper variable to 
measure the rate of profit. Therefore, Glassman had to estimate net fixed capital stock 
from gross fixed capital stock by estimating the average life of fixed capital at 25 years, 
and hence, an annual depreciation is 1/25 of the total value of gross fixed capital.  From 
this estimation, he could obtain the estimated net fixed capital stock from 1970 to 1997, 
by using gross fixed capital stock from 1946 onwards. Glassman, as a result, was 
successful to explain that it was not only a financial sector and asset bubbles that 
triggered the crisis in 1997, but profit squeeze, realization failures, and the fall of capital 
productivity in a manufacturing sector also contributed to the rise of the crisis. 
However, there are some shortcomings in Glassman’s works. First, his rates of 
profit ended in 1997, because he wanted to use the rate of profit to explain the crisis. To 
fully utilize the power of the profit rate to understand the economy, the rate of profit 
should have been extended further, so it could have yielded some knowledge on how and 
when Thailand recovered from the crisis. Further, it could also yield some insights on the 
Thai postcrisis economy. Second, his methodology of calculating profit did not take into 
account the distinction between profits and wages from the total amount of self-employed 
workers. Third, his estimation of net fixed capital stock could not be and was not exactly 
the same as the actual data that are available at this time. 
In this chapter, I can fill all these gaps. First, I can use the most updated data to 
find the rate of profit and its determinants from 1970 to 2010. Second, I can come up 
with a rigorous methodology to estimate wages to self-employed workers to consider the 
characteristics of the Thai economy. Since a majority of the population are self-employed 
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farmers, taking these wages into account has great impact on the rate of profit and its 
components. And, third, I can take advantage of the current available data for net capital 
stock in the private sector provided by the NESDB in order to get the exact value of net 
capital stock and be able to accurately estimate the rate of profit in Thailand.  
The main focus of this chapter is on the measurement of the nonfarm rate of profit 
in the private sector. I attempt to calculate the nonfarm rate of profit in private sectors 
due to two major reasons. First, as already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, 
the nonfarm rate of profit is likely to be the best variable in Marxian economics, under 
the context of the recent Thai economic development in which private sectors and 
industrialization have been the main developmental tools. Second, there is a limitation in 
data acquisition. The data do not differentiate capitalist capital stocks from noncapitalist 
capital stocks in the farming sector. Therefore, it is more appropriate and more accurate 
to measure the rate of profit only in the nonfarm sector where all capital stocks can be 
reasonably assumed to belong to only the capitalist class.  
 




Y: Net Domestic Product  
Y’: Real Net Domestic Product 
Yf : Farm Net Domestic Product  
Yn: Nonfarm Net Domestic Product  
Π: Profit  
Πf: Farm Profit  
Πn: Nonfarm Profit  
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Wf: Total Wages in The Farming Sector  
K: Nonfarm Private Net Capital Stock  𝐾!: Real Net Capital Stock 
r: Nonfarm Profit Rate 
π: Nonfarm Profit Share  
u: Nonfarm Output-Capital Ratio  
s: Nonfarm Rate of Surplus Value  
occ: The Nonfarm Organic Composition of Capital  
ω: The Nonfarm Wage Share  𝑝: GDP Deflator  𝑝!: Capital Good Price index  
 
 
3.3.2. Sources of Data 
 
 Data for profit rate measurement are taken from the three following sources. 
1. The main source of data for most of the variables is National Income of 
Thailand compiled by Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB). To obtain the series of national income from 1970 to 2010, I had to collect the 
data from both the NESDB’s website and the NESDB’s reports, which can be listed as 
follows. 
1.1 The data from 1970 to 1979 are available in National Income of Thailand: 
New Series 1970 – 1987. 
1.2 The data from 1980 to 1989 are available in the file National Income of 
Thailand: 1980 – 2001 edition.  
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1.3 The data from 1990 to 2010 are available in the file National Accounts of 
Thailand: New Series (Chain Volume Measures 1990 – 2010), which is the latest version 
of the national income account of Thailand by NESDB. 
There is an overlap of available data from 1980 to 1987 from source 1.1 and 
source 1.2, and another overlap from 1990 to 2001 from source 1.2 and source 1.3. The 
NESDB has yearly revised the National Income Account, so data during the overlapped 
years is different in different reports. As suggested by the NESDB’s staff, the data for the 
overlapped years presented in the later reports are more accurate. Therefore, I use the 
data of 1970 to 1979 from source 1.1, that of 1980 to 1989 from source 1.2, and that of 
1990 to 2010 from source 1.3. 
2. Another source of data is historical data of GDP from 1951 to 1996. The data 
are available on the NESDB’s website. This table was published after National Income of 
Thailand: New Series 1970 – 1987, and hence, it is expected to inform more accurate 
GDP than source 1.1, according to what is suggested by the NESDB’s staff as explained 
above. Therefore, the data of both nominal and real GDP from 1970 to 1979 are obtained 
from this source. 
3. The last source of data is Capital Stock of Thailand: 1970 – 2011, which 
contains the data on private net capital stock.  
 
3.3.3. Explanations of the Variables and the Compilation of Data 
 
1. Net Domestic Product (Y) = GDP – provision for consumption of fixed capital 
= farm GDP + nonfarm GDP – provision for consumption of fixed capital 
GDP at market prices from 1970 to 1979 is obtained from Table 1: Gross 
Domestic Product at Current Market Prices by Industrial Origin of source 2, and GDP 
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from 1980 to 1989 is obtained from Account 1: Domestic Product of source 1.2 
Meanwhile, provision for consumption of fixed capital is obtained from Account 1: 
Domestic Product of source 1.1 and 1.2.  
Net Domestic Product of 1990 to 2010 is instantly available in Account 2: 
Generation of Income Account of source 1.3. Since the agricultural sector takes a big 
share of total production in Thailand, total GDP can be divided into two types: farm GDP 
and nonfarm GDP. In all sources, the sum of farm GDP and nonfarm GDP is always 
equal to total GDP.  
– Farm Net Domestic Product (Yf) = Farm GDP – estimated provision for 
consumption of fixed capital in a farming sector 
Since farm GDP is always reported in the same table as GDP, the data of farm 
GDP is obtained from the exact same sources as explained in the case of GDP. However, 
one difficulty is that the NESDB revised the definition of farm GDP. The data from 1970 
to 1989 include the entry “Simple Agricultural Processing Products” in the agricultural 
sector, but the data from 1990 to 2010 consider this entry as a part of manufacturing 
production. In order to have a consistent definition of data, as suggested by the NESDB’s 
staff, “Simple Agricultural Processing Products” is subtracted from farm GDP from 1970 
to 1989. Meanwhile, estimated provision for consumption of fixed capital is reported in 
an aggregate level, so the exact data of this depreciation in a farming sector are unknown. 
To estimate this value, I collect the data of net capital stock from Table 7 Net Capital 
Stock of Thailand at Current Replacement Cost of source 3 where total net capital stock 
is divided into net capital stock in a farming sector and that in a nonfarm sector. Hence, I 
assume that the ratio of depreciation in the farming sector to the total depreciation should 
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be equal to the ratio of net capital stock in the farming sector to total net capital stock. 
That is, my estimated provision for consumption of fixed capital in the farming sector is 
equal to the ratio of net capital stock in the farming sector to total net capital stock times 
total provision for consumption of fixed capital. 
– Nonfarm Net Domestic Product (Yn) = Y – Yf  
2. Profit (Π) = (Saving of Private Corporations + Property Income + Direct Taxes 
on Corporations + Corporate Transfer Payments + unincorporated profit – Interests on 
Consumers’ Debt) 
Profit, by definition, is composed of four categories: corporate profits, non-
corporate profits, interests, and rents. Corporate profits comprise the following four sub-
categories; saving of private corporations, direct taxes on corporations, corporate transfer 
payments, and dividends. The first three subcategories of corporate profits are given 
instantly in source 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, but dividends are a part of total property income. The 
two other parts of property income are interests and rents. Interests on consumers’ debt 
are subtracted from property income, because they are not derived from the production 
process.  
 Since the aim is to find aggregate profit in a nonfarm private sector, government 
profit should be ruled out. The data of saving of private corporations is obtained from 
Savings of Corporations and Government Enterprises of Account 2 National Income less 
Savings of Public Corporations and Government Enterprises of Table 57 Savings of 
Corporations of source 1.1, Savings of Corporations and Government Enterprises of 
Account 2 National Income less Savings of Public Corporations and Government 
Enterprises of Table 56 Savings of Corporations of source 1.2, and Savings of 
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Corporations of Table 42 Distribution of the National Income at Current Market Prices 
less Saving of Public and Government Enterprises of Table 50 Saving of Corporations of 
source 1.3. 
 Direct taxes of corporations, corporate transfer payments, and interests on 
consumers’ debts are obtained from Direct Taxes of Corporations, Corporate Transfer 
Payments, Interests on Consumers’ Debt of Account 2 National Income of source 1.1 and 
1.2 and from Corporate Current Taxes on Income of Table 42 Distribution of National 
Income at Current Market Prices of source 1.3. 
 Property income is obtained from Income from Property of Account 2 National 
Income less Imputed Rent of Table 54 Income from Property Received by Household and 
Private Non-Profit Institutions of source 1.1 and 1.2, and Households Property Income 
Receivable of Table 42 Distribution of the National Income at Current Market Prices less 
Imputed Rent of Table 48 Households and NPISHs Property Income Receivable. It is 
important to deduct imputed rent from total property income. This is because imputed 
rent is estimated returns of owner-occupied property. In the case of Thailand, self-owned 
properties are mostly self-owned farms and residential properties which do not generate 
profits.  
Unincorporated income in the National Accounts of Thailand is divided into farm 
and nonfarm unincorporated income as well. In the farming sector, Bryant and Gray 
(2005) using the 2003 Labor Force Survey found that most workers are self-employed, 
while the proportion of capitalist farmers is very low in the total agricultural work force. 
In addition, since the 1960s, the labor force was certainly transferred from the farming 
sector to in the nonfarm sector (Phongpaichit and Baker 2002: 200 – 201), because 
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working as wage-workers in the nonfarm sector yielded them higher incomes than being 
self-employed in the farms. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that all unincorporated 
income in the farming sector should be considered as wage equivalents to self-employed 
farmers. The next issue is how to deal with nonfarm unincorporated income. Since most 
unincorporated enterprises are small and directly run by their owners, the owners obtain a 
part of income as profits and another part as wages for being self-employed. Following 
the method used in other profit-rate literature (e.g. Wolff 2001) and Izyumov and 
Alterman (2005)), I simply assume that a half of this income is profits, while another half 
is wages of being self-employed. Unincorporated profit is hence equal to a half of 
nonfarm unincirporated income. Hence, it is equal to a half of Others of Table 53 Income 
from Farms, Professions and Other of source 1.1, Others of Table 55 Income from Farms, 
Professions and Other Unincorporated Enterprises Received by Households of source 
1.2, and Others of Table 47 Households and NPISHs Mixed Income Receivable of source 
1.3. 
 The sum of these four categories is defined as total profit collected from the Thai 
National Income Accounts. This total profit, to be compatible with other data, should be 
divided into farm profit and nonfarm profit too.  
– Farm Profit (Πf) = Yf – total wages in the farming sector (Wf) 
Even though most farmers are self-employed and their incomes are considered as 
wages, there are still some capitalist corporations in the farming sector. Therefore, it is 
necessary to estimate farm profit to be deducted from the total corporate profit. 
Unfortunately, the data on farm profit are not available, so I use the following method. 
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The first part of total wages in the farming sector is compensation of employees in 
the farming sector, and the second part is, as stated above, all unincorporated income in 
the farming sector. Total wages in the farming sector are hence equal to; Agriculture of 
Table 52 Compensation of Employees pluses Farm Income of Table 53 Income from 
Farms, Professions and Other of source 1.1, Agriculture of Table 53 Compensation of 
Employees pluses Farm Income of Table 55 Income from Farms, Professions and Other 
Unincorporated Enterprises Received by Households of source 1.2, and Agriculture of 
Table 46 Compensation of Employees pluses Farm Income of Table 47 Households and 
NPISHs Mixed Income Receivable of source 1.3. In addition, since “Simple Agricultural 
Processing Products” is a part of the agricultural sector from 1970 to 1989, wages paid in 
“Simple Agricultural Processing Products” are included in total wages in the farming 
sector only from 1970 to 1989, but not from 1990 to 2010. Following how Yf is 
previously defined, these wages should be subtracted from total wages from 1970 to 1989. 
However, data on wages paid in “Simple Agricultural Processing Products” are not 
available, so I have to estimate them. To estimate wages paid in “Simple Agricultural 
Processing Products,” I find the proportion of “Simple Agricultural Processing Products” 
in the total farm GDP, and I simply assume that it is equal to the proportion of wages 
paid in this sector in total wages in the farming sector.  
– Nonfarm Profit (Πn) = Π - Πf     
3. Nonfarm Private Net Capital Stock (K) = Non-Agriculture Private Net Capital 
Stock – Net Private Capital Stock of Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 
 All of these variables are obtained from Table 9 Net Capital Stock of Private 
Sector of source 3. The reason for subtracting net capital stock of the real estate sector is 
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because most of these capital stocks are residential, which do not generate profit. 
Therefore, they should not be used to measure the nonfarm rate of profit. 
 
3.4 The Rate of Profit in Thailand and Its Decompositions 
 
 As defined by Dumenil and Levy (2004a: 22-23), “the rate of profit is the 
indicator of the profitability of capital.” Since the purpose is to measure the nonfarm rate 
of profit in a private sector in Thailand, the nonfarm rate of profit, by definition, is: 
 
  𝑟 = !!!          (3.1)  
 
 
Furthermore, the rate of profit can be decomposed further as a product of the nonfarm 
profit share (π) and the nonfarm output-capital ratio (u), where 
 
 𝜋 = !!!!          (3.2) 
 
 
  𝑢 = !!!          (3.3) 
 
 
where Yn is the net domestic product in the nonfarm sector. Hence,  
 
 
  𝑟 = !!!! ∙ !!! = 𝜋 ∙ 𝑢       (3.4) 
 
Figure 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 present 𝑟, 𝜋, and 𝑢 in Thailand from 1970 to 2010, respectively. 
According to Weisskopf (1979) and Wolff (2003), the nonfarm rate of profit can 
alternatively be considered as a product of the nonfarm rate of surplus value (s) and the 
inverse of the nonfarm organic composition of capital (occ). Following this method, I can 
decompose the Thai nonfarm rate of profit in the following way. 
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Figure 3.3 The Nonfarm Output – Capital Ratio (un) in Thailand: 1970 – 2010 
 
 
  𝑠 = !!!!         (3.5) 
 
 






  𝑟 = !!!! ∙ !!! = !!""       (3.7) 
 
 
Meanwhile, the rate of surplus value (equation (3.5)) represents profits to 
capitalists as a return for one unit spent as wages. This rate is also known as the rate of 
exploitation because it expresses values of production in excess of necessary labor time, 
implying the ability of capitalists to exploit workers by appropriating a part of total 
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represents powers of workers to bargain for their wages and those of capitalists to 
appropriate surplus value from a total value of production.  
The organic composition of capital (equation (3.6)) is the ratio of variable capital 
to fixed capital used in the economy. The rate itself tells the relationship between labor 
power and capital in a particular mode of production in an economy. Marx argues that, as 
capitalism develops, capitalists tend to replace variable capital (which means labor 
powers) with constant capital (which means fixed capital), so the organic composition of 
capital tends to increase. This phenomenon can be commonly seen as different stages of 
development in a newly rising economy; i.e., a country starts its development process 
with labor-intensive production processes and then moves forward to more capital-
intensive production processes. The rising organic composition of capital is, in Marxian 
theory, very important, since it is considered as a key to a falling rate of profit and hence 
economic crisis in a capitalist economy. 
From this alternative decomposition, Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, respectively, 
present the nonfarm rate of surplus value and the nonfarm organic composition of capital 
in Thailand from 1970 to 2010. 
I consider that equation (3.4) is the first decomposition and equation (3.7) is the 
second decomposition. To evaluate impact of each determinant on the nonfarm rate of 
profit, finding the growth rate of equation (3.4) shows that growth rate of nonfarm profit 
rate is equal to the sum of the growth rate of profit share and that of output-capital ratio, 
and finding the growth rate of equation (3.7) shows that the growth rate of nonfarm profit 
rate is equal to the difference of the growth rate of the rate of surplus value and that of the 
organic composition of capital. Furthermore, I divide the whole series into four phases  
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Figure 3.5 The Nonfarm Organic Composition of Capital (occ) in Thailand:        
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according to the shape of the nonfarm rate of profit: that is, 1970 – 1979 when it sharply 
increases, 1980 – 1989 when it has a tendency to increase, but with a slower rate, 1990 – 
1998 when it sharply drops, and 1999 – 2010 when it slightly increases. Then, since all 
series move through time, I calculate annual-average geometric growth rates of all series 
in order to see how much each component contributes to the growth of the rate of profit 
in each phase. The results are presented in Table 3.1. The columns g of the table are 
annual-average geometric growth rates in each phase. The columns i of the table are 
simply calculated by having annual-average geometric growth rates of components’ 
trends divided by those of profit rate’s trends, and then have them multiplied by one 
hundred to get numbers in a form of percentage. The ratios can be a rough indicator 
estimating impact of each determinant contributing to the growth rate of the nonfarm rate 
of profit in each phase. It is necessary to note that, from equation (3.7), the nonfarm 
organic composition of capital has a negative relationship with the nonfarm rate of profit. 
Therefore, to properly measure impact of the nonfarm organic composition of capital on 
the nonfarm rate of profit in each phase, a negative one must be multiplied. 
In the first decomposition, the nonfarm profit share moves in the opposite way 
compared to that of the nonfarm rate of profit for the first two phases, while, in the last 
two phases, it moves in the same way but its impact on the profit rate are only 8.5 percent 
in the third phase and 9.0 percent in the fourth phase. Meanwhile, the nonfarm output-
capital ratio moves together with the nonfarm rate of profit in all phases. Indeed, its 
impact in the first two phases is very large, as it can offset impact of the inversely-related 
nonfarm profit share (its impact are over 100 percent in 1970-1979 and 1980-1989). In 
the last two phases, though the profit share partially contributes to the growth rate of the  
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Table 3.1 Annual Average Growth Rates of the Rate of Profit                                    
and Its Determinants 
Unit: (%∆) 
Year 1970-1979 1980-89 1990-1998 1999-2010 
g i g i g i g i 
Rate of profit  5.7  0.9  -7.3  2.4  
First Decomposition 
1. Profit Share 






















































nonfarm rate of profit, impact of the nonfarm output-capital ratio on the movement of the 
nonfarm rate of profit are still much larger (92.1 percent in 1990-1998, and 90.8 percent 
in 1999-2000). Hence, in the case of Thailand from 1970 to 2010, the nonfarm output-
capital ratio is the main factor determining fluctuations of the nonfarm rate of profit, 
while the nonfarm profit share played a much smaller role. 
In the case of the second decomposition, the nonfarm rate of surplus value, 
moving very similarly to the nonfarm profit share, moves in an opposite direction 
compared to the nonfarm rate of profit in the first two phases. For the last two phases, 
similarly to the case of the nonfarm profit share, despite its impact in the last two phases, 
the nonfarm rate of surplus value contributes only 11.9 percent in the third phase and 
12.5 percent in the fourth phase. Meanwhile, the nonfarm organic composition of 
capital’s impact on the growth rate of the nonfarm rate of profit is great enough to offset 
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negative impact of the nonfarm rate of surplus value in the first two phases. In addition, 
in spite of the partial contribution of the growth rate of the nonfarm rate of profit in the 
last two phases, the nonfarm organic composition of capital still contributes 95.1 percent 
in the third phase and 85.5 percent in the fourth phase.  
From these two decompositions, I can conclude that the nonfarm output-capital 
ratio and the organic composition of capital are the major determinant of the nonfarm rate 
of profit, while the profit share and the rate of surplus value have relatively smaller 
impacts on the nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand from 1970 to 2010.  
 
3.5 The Rate of Profit in Thailand and the Thai Economy 
 
3.5.1 The Labor Market 
 
Because net domestic product is divided to be wages and profits, the nonfarm 
profit share can also tell the nonfarm wage share (ω) from the relation 
 
 𝜔 = !!!!  
    = !!!!!!!   
ω = 1 – π         (3.8) 
Equation (3.8) shows that the nonfarm profit share implies a ratio of wage share.  
In a Marxian tradition, a change in wage share depends on the relationship 
between bargaining power of workers and that of capitalists, determined by labor demand 
to run an economy and a size of a reserve army of labor. In particular, rapid economic 
growth, leading to increasing labor demand and decreasing the size of the reserve army of 
labor, allows workers to have greater bargaining power to ask higher wages, so the 
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nonfarm profit share tends to drop, and vice versa. Since Thailand has encountered both 
fast economic growth and disastrous economic recession, it is very interesting to see that 
the nonfarm profit share barely determines the nonfarm rate of profit. In more details, it is 
even more striking to see that from 1970 to 1979 when the nonfarm rate of profit rose 
very rapidly, the nonfarm profit share moved even in the opposite way. As conflicts 
between classes determine nonfarm profit share, it can be argued that intense class 
conflicts that are significant to impact distribution of income has never occurred in 
Thailand. As a result, fluctuations of the profit share have never had significant impact on 
the nonfarm rate of profit.  
The insignificance of the labor market to influence the nonfarm rate of profit may 
be a consequence of two reasons: the structure of the Thai labor market and the role of 
the government. In the case of the structure of the labor market, Thailand has had a very 
large size of the reserve army of labor in the traditional farming sector which has 
provided nearly unlimited supply of labor to meet labor demand in nonfarm sectors. In 
the 1970s, during the early process of industrialization, which is mainly run by labor-
intensive industries such as textile and garment industries, 3-4 millions of workers in the 
farming sector came to Bangkok to meet increasing demands in the manufacturing sector 
for labors in a form of off-seasonal employment, so it can be said that the process of 
proletarianization began (Phongpaichit and Baker 2002: 202). This unique adjustment in 
the Thai labor market suggests that supply of labor has the ability to meet labor demand, 
so sharp reduction of the reserve army of labor that allows workers to have higher 
bargaining power has been barely observed in Thailand. One case in the history that, as 
argued by Phongpaichit and Baker (1999: 96), Thai manufacturers faced a shortage of 
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labor supply and real wage rates rose was during the first half of the 1990s, and this led to 
the loss of competitiveness in the export sector. In spite of the fact that real wage 
increased, the rising profit share and the rising rate of surplus value suggest that this 
increasing real wage was not as fast as increasing productivity in the nonfarm sector. 
Therefore, it was increasing labor productivity, not a shortage of labor supply nor greater 
bargaining power of workers, which led to higher real wage. In addition, the farming 
sector also acts as an absorber of nonfarming unemployed workers, so an increasing size 
of the reserve army of unemployed workers do not really allow capitalists to have greater 
bargaining power. The obvious example of this case is during the crisis in 1997-98. 
During this harshest economic crisis in the country’s history, according to the World 
Bank’s data, the growth rate of GDP per capital was as low as -12%, but unemployment 
rate had never been greater than 3% although many workers were laid off. The secret 
behind this low unemployment rate in the midst of the crisis was simply because laid-off 
workers returned to work in their family-owned farms. Therefore, as suggested by Figure 
3.2 and Figure 3.4, the profit share and the rate of surplus value, in spite of a sharp drop 
of the nonfarm rate of profit, have a tendency to slightly drop until 2003. That is, the 
crisis did not completely destroy bargaining power of workers, and capitalists’ income 
losses were bigger than workers’ wage losses.8 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This, however, does not mean that capitalists suffer from the crisis more than workers. 
Ungpakorn (2001) argued that, as a consequence of the crisis, “restructuring offensive” – the tool, 
such as privatization of state-owned enterprises, delay of an unemployment benefit scheme, and 
repression of real wage, used by capitalists to transfer economic burdens from the crisis to 
workers – was implemented, so workers were those who really suffered from the crisis. This 
argument is correct if it is considered that workers’ incomes were very close to the poverty line, 
so small drops of their income put them in poverty.   
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For the latter reason, Hewison and Brown (1993) also emphasized the role of 
politics on the strength of labor unions; that is, more liberal-democratic governments 
tended to yield more benefits towards the working class. In addition, Brown (2004: 89-
91) added that, in spite of several attempts to increase the bargaining power of the 
working class and to strengthen labor unions, the ‘conservative’ governments had been in 
power for most of the time from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Therefore, the working 
class had never gained a winning momentum in wage-profit struggles, because the 
governments employed several tactics to disarray strengths of labor organizations. 
Among many examples given in his book to support the arguments, Brown’s example 
(2004: 109) on the attempt by the National Peacekeeping Council’s Announcement 54 to 
abolish the 1975 Labor Relation Act may be the most obvious intention by the 
government to destroy workers’ bargaining power.9  
It is important to emphasize that this section does not say that labor has not been 
important for the Thai economic development. However, it actually argues that a unique 
characteristics of the Thai labor market has prevented an emergence of intense class 
struggle, so the profit share and the rate of surplus value do not play a significant role to 
determine the nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand. Labor, interacting with capital, has 
played a very important role to the development of the Thai economy, as I can explain in 
the next section. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The National Peacekeeping Council was a military clique overthrowing the elected government 
of Chatichai Choonhavan in February 23th, 1991. The coup was known as a response from the 
Thai conservatives. The attempt to weaken the Labor Relation Act was one practice with which 
the government tried to abolish the heritage of left-wing movements, because the Act had been 
created during the rise of democracy in 1975 to expand the space to create and strengthen labor 
organization 
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3.5.2 Capital-Labor Relation 
 
The significance of the nonfarm output-capital ratio and the nonfarm organic 
composition of capital to determine the rate of profit suggests that the development of the 
Thai economy has been due to relations between capital and labor to generate outputs. A 
sharp drop of the organic composition of capital, which increases the nonfarm rate of 
profit during the 1970s, was obviously due to the process of proletarization in which self-
employed farmers became both off-seasonal and permanent workers. At the time, a 
massive number of workers migrated to the city, while labor-intensive industries enjoyed 
low labor cost. Therefore, the textile industry became the spearhead of Thailand’s export 
and economic growth. Not only did it account for 6% of total exports, the textile industry 
employed 54,000 workers by 1979 (Pasuk and Baker 2002: 140). As a result, wage bills 
for the whole economy increased rapidly, while the value of net capital stock increased at 
a relatively slower pace. This led to the lower nonfarm organic composition of capital 
and the higher nonfarm profit rate. This large reserve army of labor in Thailand during 
the early period of industrialization is compatible with Marx’s explanation on how “the 
relative surplus population” can act as a counteracting factor of falling profit rate (1991: 
343-344). 
As the economy developed, the role of labor-intensive industries to drive the 
economy gradually faded down, while the manufacturing sector replaced the position of 
the leading sector of the economy. Some capital-intensive industries, such as automobiles 
and parts, electronics, and machineries, played a bigger role to boost the economy, so the 
values of GDP originating from machinery grew around 9 fold, 12 fold for electrical 
machineries and supply, and 5 fold for transport equipment during 1982-1992. Even 
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though many self-employed farmers continually moved to the city to be workers, uses of 
capital in production processes increased faster. As a result, the organic composition of 
capital dropped at a slower rate since 1980 and started increasing in 1989. From 1990 to 
1998, the Thai economy merged to Marx’s prediction of the falling rate of profit in which 
the rising organic composition of capital plays a main role. Investment as a percentage of 
GDP accounted for 28 percent in 1980, but this ratio kept increasing until reaching 
around 40 percent in 1990. After 1990 until the crisis hit in 1997, this ratio stayed at 
around 40 percent for the whole period. This greater share of investment in total GDP 
signals that the value of net fixed capital stock increased relatively fast compared to 
rising GDP. Because of this, the output-capital ratio also dropped and contributed to the 
lower nonfarm rate of profit. In this sense, as long as the economy develops and more 
capital is used in the production process, the falling rate of profit can be understood as a 
result of lower productivity of capital. This is what Dumenil and Levy (2004: 35) called a 
“trajectory 𝑎  la Marx.”   
 
3.5.3 The Effects of Changes in Prices 
 
It is important to note that net domestic product (Y) and net fixed capital (K) are 
based on different prices: GDP deflator expresses price level of Y, while capital goods 
price index expresses price level of K. Since equation (3.3), explaining the components of 
the output-capital ratio, is in nominal values, it can be transformed to be a function of real 
values and their prices as follows. 
 
  𝑢 =    !∙!!!!∙!!        (3.3*) 
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where 𝑝 is GDP deflator, 𝑝! is capital good price index, 𝑌!  is the real value of net 
domestic product, and 𝐾! is the real value of net capital stock. The focus of this part is on 
these two price indexes. Taking the rate of change of equation (3.3*) yields that the 
growth rate of 𝑝, which is the inflation rate of GDP, and the growth rate of 𝑝!, which is 
the inflation rate of capital goods, affect the growth rate of u. Since u is the determinant 
of the rate of profit, differences of these two inflation rates can have great impact on the 
rate of profit.   
Since the nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand has been mainly determined by the 
nonfarm output-capital ratio, relative changes of these price indexes can, hence, lead to 
changes of the nonfarm rate of profit. Figure 3.6 presents annual inflation rates of GDP 
and annual inflation rates of capital goods from 1971 to 2010. The figure shows that these 
two inflation rates moved relatively similarly from 1981 to 2011, but they were different 
during the 1970s. Therefore, different changes of these two price indexes had impact on 
the nonfarm rate of profit only from the 1971 to 1980, while they became neutral from 
1981 to 2011. During the 1970s, GDP deflator rose much faster than capital goods price 
index. As a result, price of capital became relatively cheaper, so investors tended to make 
more profit in nominal value from their fixed capital and hence the rate of profit increases. 
This is an obvious benefit to capitalists in Thailand who invested in textiles and other 
agricultural products to make higher profits out of their fixed capital. This “cheapening of 
the elements of constant capital” is one of the counteracting factors when Marx mentions 
the factors that could be against the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Marx 1991 :342-
343). This factor played a role on the fast-growing nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand only 
in the 1970s, before it became neutral after the 1980s. 





Figure 3.6 Inflation rate of GDP and Inflation rate of capital goods                               




The nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand can be divided into four phases: the sharp 
rise during the 1970s, the fluctuation with slightly increasing trend during the 1980s, the 
sharp drop during 1990 to 1998, and the slight increase from 1999 to present. The 
decompositions tell that the output-capital ratio and the organic composition of capital in 
the nonfarm sector are the main determinants of the nonfarm profit rate, while the profit 
share and the rate of surplus value did not have impact during the first two phases and 
had only slight impact in the last two phases.  
In the first phase, workers were pulled from the countryside to work in labor-
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was still small and economic growth was built by labor-powers. The nonfarm profit rate 
hence increased, and this was a foundation for economic boom in the next decade. In the 
second phase, a few small crises in the early 1980s led to fluctuations of the nonfarm 
profit rate. The high profit rate attracted investments, and production process leaned to be 
more capital-intensive. However, shooting export growth since 1986 pushed up the 
country’s economic growth, so the nonfarm profit rate kept rising in spite of the 
increasing uses of capital in production processes. During the late 1980s, a massive 
amount of foreign capital flew into the country to energize economic growth. In the third 
phase, uses of capital were excessive and a sign of economic crisis appeared, as the 
nonfarm rate of profit started dropping. The decreasing nonfarm rate of profit led to 
foreign investors’ losses of confidence in the Thai economy, so foreign capital eventually 
flew away from the country and the crisis erupted. After the crisis, in the fourth phase, 
the rate of profit, in spite of its small increase in 1999 and 2000, never showed a clear 
trend of increase until 2002. Since the rate of profit theoretically signals the health of the 
economy, the nonfarm rate of profit evaluates that Thailand got stuck in a deep hole of 
the crisis in 1997-98 for around four years and it was as late as 2002 when Thailand 
could fully recovered from the crisis. After the crisis, the nonfarm rate of profit, even 
with its rising trend, cannot returns to its high rate prior to the crisis, so economic growth 
cannot get back to reach its prosperous rate. Chapter 5 will use the model presented in 











PROFIT RATE AND THE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS-CONSTRAINED 




 To be able to explain the interaction between the rate of profit and the balance of 
payments of a country, the dynamic model of the balance of payments and the rate of 
profit presented in Chapter 2 requires two preliminary assumptions. First, the original 
Thirlwall’s law – equation (2.5) – can act as the equilibrium growth rule of an economy 
by being able to predict the actual growth rate, while the extended Thirlwal’s law – 
equation (2.17) – should yield a better predicted rate of economic growth. Second, 
because the extended Thirlwall’s law is a function of the growth rate of capital flows, in 
order to eligibly construct equation (2.21), it is necessary that the growth rate of capital 
flows must be determined by the rate of profit.  
This chapter is aimed at providing some empirical support to argue that the model 
in Chapter 2 can explain the growth rate of the Thai economy by trying to prove that two 
preliminary assumptions hold. Hence, this chapter can be considered as being composed 
of two main parts, and each part is attempting to prove each assumption for the case of 
Thailand. The period of consideration in this chapter is from 1980 to 2010. I omit to test 
the data from 1970 to 1980, because of the following two reasons. The first one is a 
problem of data availability. The data on capital inflows of Thailand are not available 
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prior to 1975. Since I calculate a five-year moving average of some variables in order to 
eliminate some cyclical fluctuations, using empirical works prior to 1980 are not doable. 
The second reason is regarding the stage of economic development in Thailand. The 
1980s was the period in which the country started employing the export-led strategy and 
encouraging foreign capital inflows to boost the economy, so the two preliminary 
assumptions and hence the model are likely to be valid to explain the Thai economy after 
the 1980s. 
To test the first preliminary assumption, the first part of this section is going to 
test whether the original Thirlwall’s law and the extended Thirlwall’s law can predict the 
actual rate of economic growth. In spite of a wide range of literature on empirical tests of 
Thirlwall’s law, there has been just one work by Ansari et al. (2000) trying to test 
whether the original Thirlwall’s law holds in four Southeast Asian countries, including 
Thailand, from 1970 to 1996. The result is that the original Thirlwall’s law does not hold 
in Thailand, because the predicted growth rate is, on average, lower than the actual 
growth rate. In spite of the existence of this work, there are three main reasons that I 
should retest whether or not Thailand has been constrained by the balance of payments. 
First, whether or not Thailand has been constrained by the balance of payments after 
1996 is still unknown, as the work covers the data only from 1970 to 1996. Second, since 
the predicted growth rate obtained from the original Thirlwall’s law is lower than the 
actual growth rate, according to Thirlwall and Hussain (1982), this might be because 
capital inflows that also affect the balance of payments are not considered. Third, Ansari 
et al. (2000) estimated that the income elasticity of import in Thailand from 1970 to 1996 
is equal to 2.86. Compared with Sinha (1997) who estimated that the long-run income 
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elasticity of import in Thailand from 1953 to 1990 was merely 2.15, the estimated income 
elasticity of import by Ansari et. al. (2000) might be too high, so it might yield a too-low 
predicted growth rate. 
 The second section of this chapter relies heavily on the Marxian argument that the 
rate of profit is the main determinant of capital flows in order to find a positive 
relationship between the rate of profit and the growth rate of capital flows in order to 
confirm the validity of the second preliminary assumption for the case of Thailand. It is 
very interesting to see that even though Marxists consider that the rate of profit 
determines movements of capital between countries, no empirical work on this regard has 
been done before. This part could be considered as a pioneer work to empirically test this 
function of profit rate by using the case of Thailand since the 1980s. Since most foreign 
capital has been invested in nonfarm sectors of the Thai economy, profits and the rate of 
profit in the farming sector should not be involved in this matter. To be precise, it should 
be the nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand that has attracted foreign capital after the 1980s. 
Therefore, in this section, I am trying to empirically find the relationship between the 
nonfarm rate of profit and the growth rate of capital flows in Thailand from 1980 to 2010.  
 
4.2 Empirical Tests of the Thirlwall’s Laws 
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 As already mentioned in Chapter 2, the original Thirlwall’s law created by 
Thirlwall (1979) is 
 
 𝑦! =    !!         (2.5) 
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This is obviously a demand-led growth model since economic growth of a country 
depends on export demands of its products, so any change in supply side such as 
increasing productivity or increasing capacity of production is a product of export 
demands and does not generate economic growth. As discussed in Chapter 2, the original 
Thirlwall’s law requires some important assumptions of equilibriums, so it is the growth 
rule which yields equilibrium growth rate. Therefore, the original Thirlwall’s law is a 
long-run growth model acting as a center of gravity for actual growth rate. 
Then, to get closer to the reality in which some countries could have fast 
economic growth despite current account deficits, Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) showed 
that foreign capital inflows could relax a country’s balance of payments and drift the 
growth rate from its the equilibrium rate predicted by equation (2.5), despite its chronic 
deficits. The extended model is derived and simplified to be as follows. 
 
 𝑦!! =   ! ! !(!!!) !!         (2.17) 
 
 
This model implies that a debit side of a country’s capital account can increase economic 
growth, because foreign capital can also relax the balance-of-payments constraint. At the 
same time, outflows of foreign capital may negatively contribute to a country’s economic 
growth, and possibly lead to a balance-of-payments crisis as well. Since this model is 
derived from the abandonment of the assumption of current account balance, it is 
expected that its predicted growth rate obtained from equation (2.17) should be closer to 
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4.2.2 Methodology 
 Since 1979, there have been a massive number of empirical works testing the 
balance-of-payments-constrained growth models for countries and group of countries. 
Not only reviewing some articles up to 1997, McCombie (1997) also explained the 
evolution of empirical tests of balance-of-payments-constrained growth models. 
McCombie and Thirlwall (2004) reviewed the empirical tests of the models up to the year 
2003. Then, Thirlwall (2011) reviewed empirical studies of the models from 2003 
onwards. Regardless of their minor on econometrical techniques or data handling, most 
empirical studies follow the following stages of estimation. In the first stage, income 
elasticity of demand for import must be estimated. The general multiplicative demand 
function for import with constant elasticities usually assumed in literature on the balance-
of-payments-constrained growth model is; 
 
 M =  Pf
P
ϕ
Yη         (2.3) 
 
 
where M is the real value of imports, P is the domestic price of exports, Pf is the foreign 
price of imports in domestic currency, ϕ is the price elasticity of demand for imports, and 
η is the income elasticity of demand for imports. From the function, instead of 
understanding Pf and P separately, we can understand that 
Pf
P
 is an inverse function of a 
country’s term of trade. Following Thirlwall and Hussain (1982), the income elasticity of 
demand for imports can be estimated from the following equation.	   	   	   	  	  
 ln M = ln A + ϕ ln   Pf
P
 + η ln (Y)      (4.2) 
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The coefficient η in front of the variable 𝑙𝑛𝑌! in the regression of (3) means the value of 
the income elasticity of demand for imports. As a number of samples are required for 
each variable, η is hence a long-run income elasticity of demand for imports. 
Because this is a time series regression, a general problem of time series data is 
the problem of nonstationary variables in which their mean, or variance, or both of them 
vary through time, because their current values are determined by previous values. 
Therefore, behaviors of these nonstationary variables can be understood only under the 
time of consideration, but the knowledge on these variables cannot be generalized to 
other time periods. This problem of nonstationarity is also generally known as a unit root 
problem. A regression of nonstationary variables can cause the phenomenon of spurious 
regression in which a result could present a relation of unrelated variables. In other words, 
coefficients of independent variables could be statistically significant and R2 could be 
excessively high. To avoid this problem, the unit root test and cointegration test must be 
applied to check if any variable contains a unit root problem and to avoid spurious 
regression. 
 In the second stage, 𝑦! and 𝑦!!  are estimated from equation (2.5) and equation 
(2.17), respectively.  
In the third stage, annual growth rate of 𝑦! and 𝑦!!  must be econometrically tested 
with actual growth rate 𝑦  in order to tell whether or not 𝑦! and 𝑦!!  are valid to explain 𝑦. In this chapter, I follow the econometric test of the balance-of-payments-constrained 
growth model designed by Bairam (1988) explaining by the following equations 
 
 𝑦 = 𝛽!𝑦!         (4.3) 
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and     𝑦 = 𝛽!𝑦!!          (4.4) 
 
 
The coefficients in front of 𝑦! and 𝑦!!  are to tell validity of the original Thirlwall’s law 
and the extended Thirlwall’s law to explain a country’s actual growth rate. That is, if 𝛽!is 
equal to one, the original Thirlwall’s law is valid. Meanwhile, if 𝛽!  is equal to one, the 
extended Thirlwall’s law is valid. That is, the Wald tests by setting null hypotheses 𝛽! = 1 and 𝛽! = 1 must be tested by using F-value statistics. In order for the original 
Thirlwall’s law and the extended Thirlwall’s law to be valid to explain a country’s 
economic growth, 𝛽! and 𝛽!, respectively, must be significant and can be considered 
equal to one according to the Wald test of parameter.  
In order to tell which predicted growth rate is better to explain actual growth rate, 
I can easily come up with the answer if one of equation of (4.3) and (4.4) is significant 
while the other one is not. However, if both are significant, the better predicted growth 
rate should be the one that deviates less from actual growth rate. In Thirlwall and Hussain 
(1982), the method used to tell whether the extended Thirlwall’s law is better than the 
original Thirlwall’s law is by calculating the average value of 𝑦! and that of 𝑦!!  in a 
certain interval of time in order to find “average deviation,” which is differences of these 
predicted growth rates and average actual growth rate. This method perhaps is too rough 
to tell the abilities of both models to predict the actual growth rate, because it ignores 
deviations of both predicted growth rates from the actual growth rate in each year. In 
other words, it is possible both growth rates may greatly fluctuate around the actual 
growth rate, but their averages are close to the average of the actual growth rate. To solve 
this problem, I, following a general formula of standard deviation, can have an alternative 
statistical reference to evaluate how much 𝑦! and 𝑦!!  deviate from actual growth rate. 
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Analogous to the standard deviation, deviation of 𝑦! and that of 𝑦!!  from actual growth 
rate 𝑦  are formulated as follows. 
 
  𝑑! = !!    (𝑦!" − 𝑦!)!!!!!        (4.5) 
 
 
and   𝑑!! = !!    (𝑦!"! − 𝑦!)!!!!!        (4.6) 
 
 
The lower the value of 𝑑! and that of 𝑑!! , the better 𝑦! and 𝑦!! , respectively, can explain 
actual growth rate, because they deviate less from 𝑦. Since it is expected that the 
extended Thirlwall’s law is better than the original Thirlwall’s law to explain actual 
growth due to its relaxation of the current account in balance, 𝑑!!  is expected to be lower 
than 𝑑! to tell that 𝑦!!  deviates less from the actual growth rate.   
 




M = Real Value of Imports; obtained from the variable ‘Imports of goods and services 
(constant 2000 US$)’	  
Pf
P
 = Inverse of Terms of Trade: elaborated from finding an annual inverse of the 
variable ‘Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100)’ 
Y = Real GDP; obtained from the variable ‘GDP (constant 2000 US$) 
x = Real Growth Rate of Value of Exports; elaborated from finding  growth rate of five-
years moving average of the variable ‘Exports of goods and services (constant 2000 
US$)’.	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c = Real Growth rate of Total Private Capital Inflows = Nominal Growth rate of Total 
Private Capital Inflows (𝑘); elaborated from finding growth rate of  five-years moving 
average of the variable ‘Private capital flows, total (BoP, current US$)’ – Growth Rate of 
domestic price level; obtained from the variable ‘Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)’ 𝜔 = The ratio of export to total receipts of foreign currency; elaborated from finding five-
years moving average of the variable ‘Exports of goods and services (current US$)’ 
divided by the sum of five-years moving average of the variable ‘Exports of goods and 
services (current US$)’ and of five-years moving average of the variable ‘Private capital 
flows, total (BoP, current US$)’ 
 
4.2.3.2 Compilations of Data 
Although foreign capital came to invest in Thailand and brought in some 
advanced technologies since the late 1960s (Doner 2009: 187), the amount had always 
been quite low. In fact, foreign capital started playing a significant role to determine 
economic growth as late as the late 1980s (Dixon 1999: 124-125). Since the model 
consists mainly of the rate of profit and foreign capital, it is more appropriate, in order to 
use the model to explain an economy, to consider the Thai economy during the era that 
foreign capital started being an important factor to determine the economy. Therefore, the 
analysis in this part tries to prove the validity of the original Thirlwall’s law and the 
extended Thirlwall’s law only from 1980 to 2010. 
Another crucial point is regarding the nature of the balance-of-payments-
constrained growth models. That is, both the original Thirlwall’s law and the extended 
Thirlwall’s law are long-run growth models. In order to really find empirical supports for 
the model, as done by Atesoglu (1993-94), cyclical movements of all variables used to 
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measure   𝑦!  and 𝑦!!  should be filtered away. As noted before, the methodology to 
calculate income elasticity of demand for imports already yields a long-run relationship 
between growth rate of import and that of GDP; that is, η is already a long-run variable, 
which can be fitted to the test of both Thirlwall’s law. However, from equation (2.5) and 
(2.17), 𝑥, 𝑐, and 𝜔 are annual growth rate which contain some cyclical fluctuations. In 
order to filter away some cyclical movements of these variables, I calculate the five-years 
moving average of the level of real and nominal values of export and nominal value of 
capital flows before calculating 𝑥, 𝑐, and 𝜔. All data can be retrieved from the database 
‘World Development Indicator (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF)’ of the 
World Bank’s World databank.  
The data of the variables used to calculate the income elasticity of demand for 
imports are the annual data from 1980 to 2010. Meanwhile, the measurement of 𝑥, 𝑐, and 𝜔 are filtered away some cyclical fluctuations by finding five-years moving average, so 
the data are the annual data from 1976 to 2010 in order to have 𝑥, 𝑐, and 𝜔 from 1980 to 
2010. 
 
4.2.4 Empirical Results 
 
4.2.4.1 Estimation of the Income Elasticity of Demand for Imports 
 
 As this is a time-series regression analysis, unit root test is a necessary first step to 
check stationarity of variables and to avoid a spurious regression. After M, Pf
P
, and Y 
are transformed into their natural logarithm according to equation (4.2), I employ the 
models with and without trend of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-
Perron test to check for stationarity of each variable. The results can be presented in 
Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 The Import Function: Unit Root Test 






d.lnY 𝐥𝐧  𝑷𝒇 𝑷 
d.  𝐥𝐧  𝑷𝒇 𝑷 









-4.49*** -4.50*** -4.43*** -4.42*** 
-1.98 -0.78 -1.63 -1.14 
-2.98** -3.13* 2.96** 3.07 
-2.24 -2.99 -2.22 -3.30* 
-5.85*** -5.72*** -6.12*** -5.92*** 
 
*** rejection of the unit root hypothesis at 1% MacKinnon’s critical value. 
 ** rejection of the unit root hypothesis at 5% MacKinnon’s critical value. 
 * rejection of the unit root hypothesis at 10% MacKinnon’s critical value 




From Table 4.1, the only variable that seems to be problematic is lnY whose first 
difference is not stationary when it is tested by the Phillips-Perron test with trend. 
However, when the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with trend is applied to test the first 
difference of lnY, the null hypothesis of lnY to have a unit root problem can be rejected at 
10% confidence interval. Hence, the test results are likely to suggest that all variables are 
stationary at their first differences (integrated of order 1, or I(1)). 
Even though all variables are I(1), it is still possible to run a nonspurious 
regression if all variables are cointegrated and have long-run relationship. In order to find 
this information, lag length selection criteria and the Johansen-Juselius cointegration test 
must be conducted. Due to a small number of observations, when the test is applied, a 
maximum number of lag length is set at equal to 2 lags. The results can be seen in Table 
4.2. Lag length selection suggests that one lag is optimal for the cointegration test. Given 
this optimal lag length, the results of the cointegration test are presented in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.2 The Import Function: Lag Length Selection 
 
LLagLL Lag FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 9.9e-06 -3.01 -2.97 -2.87 
-8.35* 1 2.7e-08* -8.92 -8.74* 
2 2.7e-08 -8.94* -8.63 -7.95 
* indicates the lag length that yields a minimum number for each information 
criterion. 
FPE is the final prediction error, AIC is Akaike’s information criterion, HQIC is 





Table 4.3 The Import Function: Johansen-Juselius Cointegration Test 
 














15.41 1 14.73 14.07 14.80* 
2 0.07* 3.76 0.74 3.76 
Model with Trend 
 
0 29.63 23.78 40.48 34.55 
1 10.80* 16.87 10.85* 18.17 
2 0.05 3.74 0.05 3.74 
* indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
 
 
According to the test result, the null hypothesis of no cointegration (Rank = 0) can 
be rejected at 95% confidence interval by both eigenvalue statistics and trace statistics in 
both the model with trend and that without trend. These results can be interpreted that all 
of the variables in the import demand function (equations (4.2)) are cointegrated, so they 
have long-run relationship. The test result generally suggests that I can proceed forward 
to find only one income elasticity of import of Thailand throughout the whole time period 
of 1980 to 2010. 
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 However, merely the conclusion from the Johansen-Juselius cointegration test 
may not be sufficient. That is, it is still arguable that the Johansen-Juselius cointegration 
yields the results of cointegration among variables, because possible structural breaks are 
not taken into account. As stated earlier, the Thai economy from 1980 to 2010 kept 
fluctuating through time from the fastest-growing economic growth to the severe 
economic crisis, so it is possible that structural breaks occurred and income elasticity of 
imports changed due to the breaks. If structural breaks were detected, dividing an 
economy into a certain number of periods, it would be methodologically better to find an 
income elasticity of import of each period.  
To take into account the possible impact of the structural breaks, the Gregor-
Hansen test, discovered by Gregory and Hansen (1996), to find cointegration of data by 
taking into consideration of structural breaks should be applied. The main idea of the test 
is not only to detect a structural break in a series of a regression but also to test, if a break 
is detected, whether or not cointegration exists despite the existence of the structural 
break. The test covers four types of structural breaks: a break in the constant term (the C 
model), a break in the constant and the trend (the C-T model), the break in the constant 
and the slope (the C-S model), and the break in the constant, slope, and trend (the C-T-S 
model).10 I test all types of the breaks to see whether or not cointegration can be detected 
and to affirm what is suggested in the Johansen-Juselius cointegration test. The results of 
the Gregory-Hansen test can be presented in Table 4.4.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 STATA is very handy, as it can run these four models instantly. It further uses some 
information criteria to find the best lag length for the calculation of the test statistics in each 
model. 
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Table 4.4 The Import Function: Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test with 
Structural Breaks 
 
Model ADF Za Zt 
Statistics Break Year Statistics Break Year Statistics Break Year 
C -4.43 1988 -4.33 1988 -22.89 1988 
C-S -5.30** 1999 -4.98 1999 -26.71 1999 
C-T -4.49 1987 -4.56 1987 -25.70 1987 
C-T-S -5.94* 1994 -5.94* 1994 -33.44 1994 
** rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% significance level. 
* rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10% significance level.  
 
According to the results, the Gregory-Hansen test with different models yields 
different break years. That is, the C model yields that 1988 is a break year, the C-S model 
yields that 1999 is a break year, the C-T model yields that 1987 is a break year, and the 
C-T-S model yields that 1994 is a break year. These different results lead to an ambiguity 
when the break year has be to decided in order to run the regression of equation (4.2). 
Furthermore, there are some possibilities that even though a structural break really 
existed, the break does not impact the estimation of equation (4.2) because all of the 
variables are cointegrated. These results can be noticed in the C-S model with 5% 
significant level of ADF test, and the C-T-S model with 10% significant level of ADF 
and Za test. From these results, the best way to calculate the income elasticity of import is 
by using the whole time period from 1980 to 2010. 
Another important point is that, in order to avoid the problem of autocorrelation, I 
use Prais-Winsten regression to run equation (4.2). The results can be presented in Table 
4.5.11 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Without using the Prais-Winsten estimation, the regression yields that the coefficient of the 
variable lnY is equal to 1.63, but the Durbin-Watson statistics signals a severe autocorrelation 
problem. The Prais-Winston estimation is a convenient procedure to solve this problem. 
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Table 4.5 The Import Function: Prais-Winsten Regression 
















Adjusted R2 0.9963 
DW 1.73 
*** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% significance level. 
* indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 10% significance level. 
 
The main focus of this regression is on the income elasticity of demand for import, 
the coefficient of variable lnY, which is statistically significant at the 1% significant level, 
and its value is equal to 1.64. The income elasticity of import is elastic because Thailand 
is an open economy whose international trades are important for its economic growth. 
Therefore, a percentage change of GDP usually leads to a large change of other 
international transactions including imports. Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
(DW=1.73) is at an appropriate level to say that the problem of autocorrelation may not 
present in this regression. 
 
4.2.4.2 Estimations of 𝑦! and 𝑦!!  
 
After obtaining η is equal to 1.64, I can proceed to calculate 𝑦! and 𝑦!!  from 
equation (2.1) and (2.8), respectively. Comparisons of the actual growth rate (y), the 
estimated growth rate obtained from the original Thirlwall’s law (yB), and the estimated 
growth rate obtained from the extended Thirlwall’s law (yB’) can graphically be 
presented in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 𝒚,   𝒚𝑩, and 𝒚𝑩! : 1980 to 2010 
 
 
4.2.4.3 The Validity of the Thirlwall’s Laws 
 
 As already explained in the section on the methodology, the test of the validity of 𝑦! and that of 𝑦!!  to explain the actual growth rate requires two stages. In the first stage, 
equation (4.3) and (4.4) must be run to get the coefficient 𝛽! and 𝛽! by using the whole 
set of data from 1980 to 2010. In the second stage, the coefficients must be tested 
whether they are equal to a unity, meaning whether or not they can be statistically 
considered as being equal to the actual growth rate.  
To a further extent, I suspect that the economic crisis in 1997-98 caused a big 
change in the Thai economy. To test the ability to explain the Thai economy of 𝑦! and 𝑦!! , 
together with running the whole series of data from 1980 to 2010, I choose 1998 as a 
critical year, and run regressions of equation (4.3) and (4.4) with restricted time periods: 
1980 to 1998 and 1999 to 2010. Table 4.6 presents the test for the validity of 𝑦! and 𝑦!!  
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&
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  growth	  (y)	   Thirlwall-­‐Hussain	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  (yb)	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Table 4.6 The Validity of the Original Thirlwall’s Law                                                  
and the Extended Thirlwall’s Law  
 
 1980 – 2010 1980 – 1998 1999 - 2010 
 Coefficients   F-statistics      Coefficients F-statistics       Coefficients       F-statistics 
 𝒚𝑩    0.92*** 
(10.37) 
   0.58    0.89*** 
(7.95) 
1.66  1.09*** 
(7.10) 
   0.35               𝒚𝑩!    0.90*** 
(10.63) 
   1.41    0.86*** 
(8.21) 
 1.05   1.13*** 
(7.44) 
   0.77 
 *** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% significance level. 
 
 
The table presents that regressions of equation (4.3) to get the coefficients of 𝑦! 
and those of (4.4) to get the coefficients of 𝑦!!  are set into three time periods: 1980-2010, 
1980-1998, and 1999-2000. The columns ‘coefficients’ show estimated 𝛽! for 𝑦! and 𝛽! 
for 𝑦!!  in the first stage of this test. The terms in the parentheses below the coefficients 
are the t-value statistics of all coefficients. The columns ‘F-statistics’ show the F-value 
statistics of the Wald test setting the null hypothesis: the coefficients are equal to one. All 
F-statistics are too low to reject the null hypothesis, so all estimated coefficients are 
statistically equal to one. As a result, in all cases, 𝑦! and 𝑦!!  can explain the actual growth 
rate of Thailand. 
 
4.2.4.4 𝑦! and 𝑦!! : Which One is Better? 
 
To tell whether 𝑦! or 𝑦!!  is better to predict the actual growth rate, I calculate 𝑑! 
and 𝑑!!  from equation (4.5) and (4.6) to tell deviation of   𝑦!  and 𝑦!!  from 𝑦. To be 
consistent with the above analysis, I still suspect that 1998 is the year that the structural 
break could occur since it was the worst year of economic downturn. The results can be 
presented in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7 Averages and Deviations of   𝒚, 𝒚𝑩, and 𝒚𝑩!  
 1980 – 2010 1980 – 1998 1999 - 2010 
 
 
Thirlwall – Hussain (𝒚𝑩! ) Average 𝒅𝑩,𝒅𝑩














Original Thirlwall (𝒚𝑩)  6.28  3.38  7.65  3.96  4.10  2.19 
 
Actual Growth (𝒚)  5.61  6.38  4.41 
 
 
 Theoretically, according to Thirlwall (1979), a country that has current account 
surplus means that its balance of payments grows faster than its national income, so 
estimated growth rates should be greater than its actual growth rate. Meanwhile, in the 
opposite case, estimated growth rates should be smaller than its actual growth rate for a 
country that suffers from its current account deficit. The results, however, are 
contradictory with the theory, because, during 1980 to 1998 when Thailand had current 
accounts deficits for most of the time, average values of  𝑦! and 𝑦!!  are greater than that of 𝑦, while, from 1999 to present when Thailand have mostly had current account surplus, 
average values of   𝑦!  and 𝑦!!  are smaller than that of 𝑦. Following Thirlwall (1979), 
explanation of these contradictions could be because of effects from relative price 
movements. According to the data on net barter term of trade index12, Thailand’s term of 
trade index had a falling tendency from 1980 to 2001, while the tendency has increased 
after that. Assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition has held throughout the period of 
consideration, the falling term of trade may contribute to too-high values of   𝑦! and 𝑦!!  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The data are available from the database ‘World Development Indicator (WDI) and Global 
Development Finance (GDF)’ of the World Bank’s World databank.  
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before the crisis erupted, while the increasing term of trade may lead to a too-low value 
of   𝑦! and 𝑦!!  after the crisis. 
In addition, the results reflect something interesting. Since the average value of 𝑦!!  is greater than that of 𝑦! prior to the crisis before it has been lower after the crisis, this 
finding suggests that capital flows were likely to favor the balance of payments from 
1980 to 1998 while they have jeopardized it since then. This is well matched with the fact 
that Thailand was one of the major destinations for foreign capital among other emerging 
countries before the crisis, but its popularity became faded afterwards.  
Even though the results show that the average value of 𝑦 is closer to that of 𝑦! 
than that of 𝑦!!  in all time periods, this does not mean that the original Thirlwall’s law is 
better than the extended Thirlwall’s law in terms of their abilities to predict 𝑦 because, as 
explained in the section on methodology, the average deviations ignore deviations in each 
year. Since 𝑑!!  is smaller than   𝑑! in all periods, this suggests that 𝑦!! , compared to 𝑦!, 
deviates less from 𝑦. Therefore, in each year, the extended Thirlwall’s law seems to yield 
a more accurate predicted growth rate in the case of the Thai economy.  
 In sum, the full course of econometric tests reveals that both the original 
Thirlwall’s law and the extended Thirlwall’s law are able to explain economic growth in 
Thailand. In addition, my calculations of 𝑑! and 𝑑!!  suggest that the extended Thirlwall’s 
law deviates less from the actual growth rate, so it is a better model to explain the Thai 
economy. As a result of these two findings, the first preliminary assumption of the model 
presented in Chapter 2 is proved true, so I can proceed to test the second preliminary 
assumption of the model in the next section. 
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4.3 Empirical Relationship between the Nonfarm Profit Rate                                   
and Capital Flows 
4.3.1 Theoretical Framework  
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Marx did not really talk about the relationship between 
profit rate and international capital flows. In his original argument (Marx 1991: 242), 
differences of profit rates among sectors of production lead to movements of capital 
seeking for highest profits, so a sector with higher profit rate would encounter capital 
inflow while capital flows out from a sector with lower profit rate. Since his goal, in this 
part, is to propose equalization of profit rates among sector, he intentionally omitted 
discussion on profit rate and capital flows between different regions or countries.  
Marxists who picked up this omitted point and consider the rate of profit as a 
determinant of foreign capital flows were those who applied Marxist theories to explain 
the stage of imperialism in the world capitalist economy. The classical debate between 
the revisionists, such as Kautsky, and Hilferding, and the revolutionaries, such as 
Luxembourg, Bukharin, and Lenin, was heavily related to imperialism. In spite of several 
disagreements on characteristics of imperialism, these classical Marxists shared the same 
understanding that imperialism was a form of capitalist expansion where capitalists in 
central countries were forced to expand their production to peripheral countries in order 
to take over cheap raw materials, find new markets, and enhance their capital 
accumulation. In addition, since Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism  
was greatly influenced by Hilferding’s Finance Capital, both revisionists and 
revolutionaries shared the same idea from the fact that the way of capitalist expansion to 
abroad shifted from exports of goods to exports of capital, especially finance capital, so 
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international capital flows became a very important tool for capitalists in some countries 
to avoid a problem of overproduction and crises in domestic economies by finding ways 
to earn more profit in other countries.  
From this point, both sides shared the same basis; that is, a falling rate of profit in 
a country forces capitalists to export their capital to other countries whose rates of profit 
are higher. According to Szymanski (1974), these classical Marxists considered that 
capital has a tendency to flow from core countries to peripheral countries in order to 
transfer surplus value from the peripheries to the cores. 
 Later, after the influential works of Baran and Sweezy in the late 1940s to the 
early 1950s, Marxist theories of imperialism shifted from the perspectives of core 
countries to see how peripheral countries suffer from imperialism (Noonan 2010: 90-125). 
The works of neo-Marxists on dependency theory such as Frank and Amin take the view 
of peripheral countries and see that peripheral countries always have higher profit rate, 
compared to those of core countries. However, as foreign capital flows in, economic 
developments in the peripheral countries must slow down, because foreign capitalists 
repatriate surplus value to the core in forms of profits and interests (Chase-Dunn 1975). 
Therefore, looking in a longer run from this perspective, as argued by Szymanski (1974), 
dependency theorists believe that economic openness eventually leads to negative net 
flows of capital in peripheries due to the greater amount of return flows. This implies that 
foreign capital causes falling rates of profit in peripheral countries. From this view, the 
same logic is still applied; that is, foreign capital flows into peripheral countries in order 
to seek for profits, so the rate of profit attracts foreign capital.   
 
 




This part is going to prove the theoretical framework explained above by 
empirically testing the relationship between the rate of profit and the growth rate of 
capital flows for the case of Thailand from 1980 to present. Since foreign capital came to 
invest in Thailand in the nonfarm sector, it is going to be more appropriate to find 
whether or not the nonfarm rate of profit could significantly determine the growth rate of 
capital flows. 
Because the second preliminary assumption concerns profit rate differential 
between the global rate of profit and a national rate of profit, these two profit rates should 
be measured. Thus far, according to literatures on profit rate measurement, only Li, Xiao, 
and Zhu (2007) have ever attempted to measure the global rate of profit, and the 
estimation has ended in 2005. Since the attempt of this dissertation is to use the model to 
explain the Thai economy until 2010, the estimation of the global rate of profit in the 
exact same methodology of Li, Xiao, and Zhu’s work (ibid.) must be redone. This 
requires clear explanation of their methodology and full access to the most updated data. 
Alternatively, another way to get the global profit rate possibly is that I can define and 
measure the global profit rate in my own way. However, this way is going to be even 
more difficult, and it requires another project to be done. To solve the difficulty of 
obtaining the global profit rate, following the assumption in the model, I consider that the 
global rate of profit is an exogenous variable, and, for the case of Thailand, I attempt to 
just see the relationship between the nonfarm rate of profit and the growth rate of foreign 
capital flows. From this point, the simple model telling the relationship between these 
two variables can be stated as follows. 
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 𝑘 = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑟         (4.7) 
 
 
where 𝑘 is the growth rate of capital inflows while  𝑟 is the nonfarm profit rate. 
Since this part employs the time series analysis, the problem of nonstationary 
variables and spurious regression are the very first things to be concerned due to their 
regular appearances in time series regression. Similar to the previous part, the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test are conducted to test unit roots of both 𝑘 and 𝑟. 
After that, the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bound testing approach, developed 
by Pesaran and Shin (1995, 1999) and Pesaran et al. (1996, 2001), is employed to find the 
relationship between 𝑘 and 𝑟 due to the following reasons. First, the ARDL bound testing 
approach is applicable, even though some variables are I(0) and some are I(1), without 
the problem of nonstationarity (Pesaran and Shin 1997: 21-24). Another advantage of 
using the ARDL approach is that the dynamic error correction model (ECM) can be 
derived from the ARDL, so the ARDL approach informs both long-run and short-run 
relationships between dependent and independent variables. 
There are two phases in the ARDL bound testing approach. For the first phase, I 
have to find whether or not variables are cointegrated and have a long-run relationship. In 
order to fulfill this task, equation (4.7) must be transformed into the ARDL unrestricted 
error correction model (UECM).  
 
 ∆𝑘! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑟!!! + 𝛼!𝑘!!! + 𝛽!!∆𝑟!!!!!!! + 𝛽!!!!!! ∆𝑘!!! + 𝑒! (4.8) 
 
 
where ∆ presents the first differences of all variables. The first part of equation (4.8), 
seizing coefficients 𝛼!  and 𝛼! , tells the long-run relationship of two variables. 
	  	  	  
100	  
Meanwhile, the second part of the equation, seizing coefficients 𝛽! and 𝛽!, tells the short-
run relationship. The best lag length should be the model that yields the lowest value of 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), 
and some diagnostic tests should be performed to test the performance of the UECM. As 
suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999), the maximum number of lag length should be 2 
for the annual series data. Then, F-test must be applied to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration  
 
 𝐻!:  𝛼! = 𝛼! = 0  
 𝐻!:  𝛼! ≠ 𝛼! ≠ 0  
 
 
To test the hypothesis, two sources of critical bounds are referred by literatures on 
the ARDL bounds testing approach. The first source is Pesaran et al. (2001) which is 
appropriate for works with a large number of observations. Developed from the first 
source, the second source is in Narayan (2004) which is appropriate for works with a 
small number of observations, i.e., 30 to 80 observations. The critical bounds presented in 
both sources have the same structure. That is, two sets of critical values are presented, the 
lower bounds of the critical values are to test the case that the variables are I(0), while the 
upper bounds of the critical values are to test the case that the variables are I(1). If all 
variables are I(0), the test only refers to the lower critical bound. Meanwhile, if all 
variables are I(1), the test only refers to the upper critical bound. In the case of having 
both I(0) and I(1) variables in the regression, if the calculated F-statistics is over the 
upper critical bound, 𝐻! can be rejected and I can conclude that cointegration exists. 
Meanwhile, if the calculated F-statistics is below the lower critical bound, 𝐻! cannot be 
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rejected and I can conclude that cointegration does not exist. And, if the calculated F-
statistics is in between lower and upper critical bound, the test is inconclusive. 
 In the second phase, after the long-run relationship among variables has been 
found, the optimal ARDL model with the optimal lag lengths of each variable (p,q) can 
be determined by using again the Akaike Information Criterion and the Bayesian 
Information Criterion. Given that the lag lengths of both variables are defined, equation 
(4.8) becomes 
 
 ∆𝑘! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑟!!! + 𝛼!𝑘!!! + 𝛽!!∆𝑟!!!!!!! + 𝛽!!!!!! ∆𝑘!!! + 𝑒! (4.8*) 
 
 
where p is the optimal lag length of 𝑘 and q is the optimal lag length of 𝑟. From the 
selected ARDL UECM, −  (!!!!) tells long-run impact of profit rate on growth rate of 
capital inflows. Meanwhile, in order to find coefficients of the short-run dynamics, the 
ARDL restricted ECM can be presented as  
 
 ∆𝑘! = 𝛼! + 𝛾𝑒𝑐𝑚!!! + 𝛽!!∆𝑟!!!!!!! + 𝛽!!!!!! ∆𝑘!!! + 𝑒!  (4.9) 
 
 
where the term ecm stands for the ECM term based on ARDL (p,q) and 𝛾  is its 
coefficient. It is expected that 𝛾 is significant and has a negative value defining the speed 
of adjustment to the equilibrium, after an external shock occurs. Meanwhile, 𝛽!! tells 
short-run impact of a change in the nonfarm profit rate on a change of the growth rate of 
capital inflow, and 𝛽!! tells short-run impact of a change of the growth rate of capital 
inflow on itself. 
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4.3.3 Data and Empirical Results 
 The nonfarm rate of profit (𝑟) has already been obtained from the profit rate 
measurement in Chapter 3, while the growth rate of capital flows (𝑘) has already been 
obtained from the calculation of 𝑐 in Section 4.2.3. 
 As stated in the section on methodology, one of the advantages of the ARDL 
bound testing approach is that it can be conducted without the problem of spurious 
regression even though some variables are stationary at their levels – I(0) – while some 
are stationary at their first differences – I(1). Therefore, in order to emphasize the reason 
of using the ARDL bound testing approach, unit root tests must be performed. The results 
of the unit root tests can be presented in Table 4.8. 
The unit root tests discover that 𝑟 is stationary at I(1), while 𝑘 is stationary at I(0). 
Since 𝑟  and 𝑘  are integrated at different orders of integration, Johansen-Juselius 
cointegration test or the Engel-Granger two-steps method cannot be applied to test 
cointegration between these two variables. Given these problems, the ARDL bound 
testing approach, due to its advantage mentioned in the section on methodology, is the 
most appropriate and the most convenient econometric technique to deal with this 
problem, because it can be applied regardless of whether variables are I(0) or I(1). 
In order to perform the ARDL bound testing approach, I can start the first phase 
by finding the optimal lag length of equation (4.8) by using information criteria. Since the 
suggested maximum lag length is 2 for annual data (Pesaran and Shin 1999), Table 4.9 
presents the value of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) from running the equation (4.8) with different values of lag 
length (m = 1 and m = 2). 
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Table 4.8 Nonfarm Profit Rate and Capital Flows: Unit Root Tests 
Variables 
 𝒓 Augmented Dickey – Fuller      Phillips - Perron Without Trend Trend Without Trend Trend -0.73 -1.44 -1.01 -1.80 
d.  𝒓 -3.60*** -3.50** -3.56*** -3.45** 𝒌 -3.51*** -4.18*** -3.42** -4.06*** 
** the null hypotheses can be rejected at 5% significant level according to 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) 
*** the null hypotheses can be rejected at 1% significant level according to 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) 
 
 
Table 4.9 Nonfarm Profit Rate and Capital Flows: Lag Lengths Selection 
 
Lags (m) AIC  BIC B-G Adj R2 
1 259.69 267.89 3.96* 0.35 
2 246.60 257.26 0.00 0.48 
- AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion, B-G 
= Breusch-Godfrey Autocorrelation test. 
* indicates that the regressions reject the null hypothesis of the test. 
 
 
 The results show that the model with 2 lags yield the minimum value of AIC and 
BIC. In addition, from my further diagnostic tests, the model with 1 lag length (m=1) 
contains autocorrelation problem, so m=2 is the optimal lag lengths to test cointegration 
between 𝑘 and 𝑟. After obtaining the optimal lag lengths, I can proceed to compare the 
computed F-statistics with the critical bounds. F-statistics is computed from the test of the 
null hypothesis, 𝐻!:  𝛼! = 𝛼! = 0. Meanwhile, since the data in this chapter are from 
1980 to 2010 with one regressor and this can considered as the case of small observations 
and equation 4.8 is a model with an intercept and no trend, the referred critical bounds 
with n = 31 and k = 1 presented in Narayan (2004) are more appropriate. The 
comparisons can be presented in Table 4.10.  
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Table 4.10 F-Statistics and the Critical Bounds. 
 
Null Hypothesis (𝐻!) F-Statistics Significance Level Critical Bounds Lower 
Bounds 
Upper Bounds 




1% 5.85 6.64 
5% 4.06 4.65 
10% 3.27 3.80 
  
 
From Table 4.10, the F-statistics is greater than the critical upper bound of 1% 
level of significance. Hence, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at 1% 
significance level, so 𝑘 and 𝑟 are cointegrated. This allows me to proceed forward to the 
second phase by determining the real ARDL equation. 
In the second phase, AIC and BIC is applied in order to find the optimal p and q 
of equation (4.8*). As a result, both information criteria suggest that the model with p=2 
and q=0 (ARDL (2,0)) is the optimal ARDL UECM describing the relationship between 𝑘 and 𝑟. Consequently, the restricted ECM can be derived to find the short-run dynamics 
of the model. In addition, some diagnostic tests are applied to tests the correct 
specification of the model. The tests suggest that the model does not have the problem of 
heteroskedasticity, since the Chi-squared statistics from the Breusch-Pagan test (𝜒!"! ) is 
too low to reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity. Low Chi-squared statistics 
from the Breusch-Godfrey test (𝜒!"! ) and the close-to-two Durbin-Watson’s statistics 
reveal that the model does not contain a problem of autocorrelation. The Ramsey’s 
RESET test yields a low Chi-squared statistics, so the null hypothesis of no omitted 
variables cannot be rejected. Lastly, the Jarque-Bera test yields Chi-squared statistics 
revealing that residuals are normally distributed. The long-run and short-run relationships, 
including the results of the diagnostic tests, can be presented in Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11 The Long-Run and Short-Run Relationships between                                  
the Growth Rate of Capital Flows and                                                                            
the Nonfarm Rate of Profit 
 
Period Variables Coefficients t-statistics Probability 
Long Run r 2.43 3.50 0.00 
Constant -31.98 -2.91 0.00 
Short Run ECM -1.68 -4.78 0.00 ∆𝑟! 3.52 1.26 0.22 ∆𝑘!!! 0.76 2.76 0.01 ∆𝑘!!! 0.49 2.29 0.03 𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠:  𝜒!"! = 0.04,𝜒!"! = 0.26,𝐷𝑊 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 = 1.88,𝜒!"#"$! = 1.77,𝜒!"! = 1.85,𝐴𝑑𝑗  𝑅! = 0.48   
 
 
 As generally done in studies using the ARDL bound testing approach, The 
Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals (CUSUM) test and the Cumulative Sum of 
Square of Recursive Residuals (CUSUMSQ) test are conducted in order to test the null 
hypothesis of having the stability of coefficients at the 5 % critical bounds. The results 
are presented in Figure 4.2 in which the lines with marks fluctuates inside of the bound in 
both figures. The results suggest that the estimated coefficients in the restricted ECM are 
stable at 5% bound level of significance.  
 According to Table 4.11, the ARDL bound testing approach yields that 1% 
change in the nonfarm rate of profit results in 2.43 % change in the growth rate of capital 
flows in the same direction. This proves the hypothesis that the nonfarm rate of profit and 
the growth rate of capital flows have a positive relationship in the case of Thailand from  
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1980 to 2010. Following what is expected, the coefficient -1.68 of the ECM term is 
negative, expressing the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium when the system 
is disturbed by short-run shocks. In the short run, a change in nonfarm profit rate does not 
have statistically significant impact on the growth rate of capital flows. In contrast, only 
previous changes of the growth rates of capital flows (the first lag and the second lag) 




 This chapter empirically finds that two preliminary assumptions – the validity of 
the original and extended Thirlwall’s law and the nonfarm rate of profit as a determinant 
of the growth rate of capital flows – hold for the case of Thailand from 1980-2010. The 
first part, attempting to prove the first preliminary assumption, shows that Thailand has 
been constrained by its balance of payments, since both the original and extended 
Thirlwall’s law can explain the economy. Moreover, it shows that the extended 
Thirlwall’s law is a better model, as it yields more accurate growth rates. The second part, 
attempting to prove the second preliminary assumption, uses the ARDL bound testing 
approach to show that the nonfarm rate of profit determines the grow rate of foreign 
capital flows in Thailand. This finding is complementary with many Marxian works 
which consider that the rate of profit is the important variable determining flows of 













5.1 The Model and The Thai Economy 
 
Since the period of industrialization in the 1970s, the Thai economy has leaned 
more and more toward the ideology of the self-regulating market by taking the path of 
economic liberalism. Diversification of domestic productions, which had been greatly 
supported by the government in the 1970s in order to serve the import-substitution 
strategy, was redirected to specialization of some industries to raise competitiveness in 
the world market and to increase export values in the early 1980s. Later, when more and 
more foreign capital considered Thailand as another spot for great deals of returns, the 
government responded by encouraging free mobilities of foreign capital. Similarly to 
other open economies, economic booms and busts have occurred at different time periods 
along the path of its economic development. An economic boom in the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s was followed by the bust in the late 1990s. In spite of this economic swing, 
the IMF, after giving out the rescue package to help Thailand out from the crisis, forced 
the country to be more open to foreign capital and to liberalize the banking sector, while 
the government adopted a stronger dose of neoliberalism by privatizing state-owned 
enterprises and making free-trade agreements. Neoliberalism has occupied a position of a 
hegemonic ideology in Thai academics and policy creations. The ASEAN Economic 
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Community (AEC) that will lead to a unified and single market of all South East Asian 
countries by 2015 is a true product of the neoliberal ideology. Thailand Development 
Research Institute (TDRI), one of the most powerful think tanks in Thailand, recently 
suggested that Thailand will be more beneficial and successful in the AEC, if the Thai 
government can liberalize trades, services, and finances. The government should only 
establish efficient trade and investment facilities (TDRI 2012).  
 In this dissertation, I propose a fusion approach by blending a Post-Keynesian 
balance-of-payments-constrained growth model with Marxian profit rate to explain the 
development of the Thai economy. That is, the interactions between profit rate oscillation 
in Marxian economics and the role of foreign capital explained in the extended 
Thirlwall’s law are used to explain the development of Thai economy. The theoretical 
core of this dissertation is located in Chapter 2 where profit rate and the balance of 
payments have impact on one another. The model proposes different cases of interactions 
between profit rate and GDP level generated from the extended Thirlwall’s law as long as 
capital is allowed to move easily across borders to seek for greater profits. Nevertheless, 
it is highly possible that only the cases of stable clock-wise cycles can happen, because 
the income elasticity of demands for imports of an open country is unlikely to be low 
enough to cause bring the system to the unstable case. This insight tells that the rate of 
profit determines business cycles in a country via fluctuations in the balance of payments. 
In a further extent, a falling rate of profit can cause economic crisis via the balance-of-
payments problem. 
 Empirically, this model can be valid to explain the development of the Thai 
economy only if two preliminary assumptions are true. The first assumption is that the 
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extended Thirlwall’s law can explain economic growth of Thailand, and the second 
assumption is that the rate of profit really determines capital flows in Thailand. Chapter 4 
of this dissertation attempts to test these two preliminary assumptions. However, before 
getting to the steps in Chapter 4 where profit rate is necessary to test the second 
assumption, the nonfarm rate of profit in Thailand from 1970 to 2010 is measured in 
Chapter 3. The main reason for finding the nonfarm rate of profit, instead of the national 
rate of profit, is two fold. First, foreign capital has flown to Thailand to invest and/or 
finance investments in nonfarm sectors, so the nonfarm rate of profit is likely to be a real 
determinant of foreign capital flows. That is, the nonfarm rate of profit seems to be the 
real variable to test the second preliminary assumption, according to the history of the 
Thai economic development. Second, because the interest of this dissertation is on the 
Thai economy after the process of industrialization in the 1970s, the nonfarm rate of 
profit seems to be better than the national rate of profit in order to explain how 
industrialization contributed to the Thai economic development.  
 The results show that the nonfarm rate of profit has fluctuated through time. The 
output-capital ratio and the organic composition of capital are the main variables 
determining the movements of the nonfarm rate of profit, while struggles between 
capitalists and workers to earn shares of national income, represented by the rate of 
surplus value and the profit share, do not have significant impact on the nonfarm rate of 
profit. The movements of the nonfarm rate of profit match well with characteristics of 
leading industries in each period. Labor intensive industries such as garments, textiles, 
and food processing products, which led the country’s economy during the 1970s to the 
early 1980s, greatly lowered the organic composition of capital, so the nonfarm rate of 
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profit quickly surged. Meanwhile, the nonfarm rate of profit fell, in spite of fast economic 
growth, due to more intensive uses of capital in the newly leading industries such as 
electronics and machineries. Unavoidably, the government’s policies to encourage 
inflows of foreign capital took an important role to find sufficient supplies of capital to 
meet demands for investments during the boom. Foreign capital came into the country in 
forms of foreign direct investments and loans to drive economic growth, especially after 
the nonfarm rate of profit reached its peak in 1986, before it started dropping for 
consecutive years. That is, the falling nonfarm rate of profit had shown a sign of a 
catastrophe before the crisis emerged in 1997. Contradictory to the precrisis case, free 
mobility of capital supported by the government allowed foreign capital to quickly flow 
away from the country when a sign of approaching crisis became apparent. The 
devaluation of Thai baht and rapid capital flights led to the balance-of-payments crisis.  
After the crisis, the nonfarm rate of profit showed a tendency of rising, but it did not 
seem to be as high as itself prior to the crisis.  
The first part of Chapter 4 presents that the original and the extended Thirlwall’s 
law are both valid to explain economic growth of Thailand, so the Thai economy has 
been constrained by the balance of payments. A further statistical reference tells that the 
extended Thirlwall’s law is better than the original Thirlwall’s law to explain the Thai 
economy. Therefore, the first preliminary assumption is also proved. The Thai economy 
from the export-led strategy in the 1980s to the current neoliberal regime has been clearly 
constrained by the balance of payments.  
 Employing the ARDL bound testing approach in the second part of Chapter 4, I 
find that the nonfarm rate of profit has a positive relationship with growth rate of foreign 
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capital flows in Thailand. Thereby, the second preliminary assumption is proved. The 
government’s attempt to liberalize flows of foreign capital since the 1980s allowed 
foreign capital to flow in and out of the country to seek for highest returns. Foreign 
capital responded to the peak nonfarm rate of profit in the middle of the 1980s by 
tremendously flowing into the country, and led to high growth rate in Thailand. 
Meanwhile, capital flight that caused the crisis was attributed to the fast drop of the 
nonfarm rate of profit in the middle of the 1990s.   
Since both of the preliminary assumptions have been empirically proved, the 
model in Chapter 2 is ready to explain the development of the Thai economy. In addition, 
not only does this empirical test in the first part of Chapter 4 approve the validity of 
Thirlwall’s law in the case of the Thai economy, it also yields that the income elasticity 
of demand for imports in Thailand is elastic (𝜂 = 1.64). It is 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒  1 of the model that 
explains the interaction between the nonfarm rate of profit and the level of GDP 
estimated from the extended Thirlwall’s law. To empirically plot the relationship between 
the two variables, I can present Figure 5.1 describing the relationship between the rate of 
profit and the estimated level of GDP from the effect of capital flows (𝑌!!) from 1980 to 
2010. Again, the reason of choosing 1980 as the starting year is because it is the year that 
the country started enhancing foreign capital inflows to generate economic growth. To 
calculate 𝑌!! , I first use the latter part of equation (2.17), (!!!) !! , and consider that this 
part is to express the growth rate of capital flows on the balance-of-payments-constrained 
growth rate. To get this growth rate, the data on ‘Private Capital Flows’ from World 
Bank’s data are employed. After obtaining the growth rate from 1980 to 2010, I 
transform the real value of GDP in the year 1979 into its natural log value. Since it is 
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Figure 5.1 The Relationship between The Nonfarm Profit Rate (r) and the 
Estimated Level of Log GDP (YB' ) in Thailand: 1980 – 2010 
 
generally known that a difference of a natural log value of current year’s real GDP and 
that of last year’s GDP multiplied by 100 tells real growth rate of the current year real 
GDP. I hence can add the growth rate of capital flows on the balance-of-payments-
constrained growth rate to the natural log value of real GDP in 1979 to get the estimated 
GDP from capital inflows in 1980. Then, I add the growth rate of the current year to the 
estimated GDP from capital inflows of the previous year to get all estimated GDP from 
capital inflows from 1980 to 2010.  
The empirics support the theoretical model. Figure 5.1 clearly shows 4 phases of 
the interaction between the nonfarm rate of profit and 𝑌!!  in the case of the Thai economy. 
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1990 to 1996 when the nonfarm rate of profit slightly dropped but 𝑌!!  grew rapidly, was 
in Phase 2. 1997 to 2001, when 𝑌!!  and the nonfarm rate of profit dropped together, was 
in Phase 3, which was a crisis phase. 2002 to 2003, when 𝑌!!  still dropped but the 
nonfarm rate of profit started bouncing back from its bottom, was in Phase 4. The next 
cycle started in 2004, but it was quite difficult to define phases of this cycle. However, 
one precise thing is that this cycle is relatively small compared to the first cycle. This is 
more or less matched with what the phase diagram suggests that the economy in the later 
cycles should be less volatile, because the rate of profit moves closer to the global rate of 
profit so capital inflows play a less significant role to relax the balance of payments and 
hence to boost economic growth. 
 The empirics also support that the cycles, theoretically presented in Chapter 2, 
really occurred during the development of the Thai economy. The cycles of the rate of 
profits caused fluctuations of the balance of payments which contributed to the unstable 
economy. This is a result of the economy where capital is allowed to fully move in order 
to seek for high returns. According to Arrighi and Silver (1992: 32), the world economy 
has, since the 1970, entered the period of the declining US hegemonic power, so the 
global mode of production has entered the period of high-finance resurgence in which a 
massive amount of finance capital seek returns in financial markets throughout the world. 
From this statement, since Thailand has tried to advance forward to a capital-mobilization 
country, it is predictable that waves of massive foreign capital will come to take profits 
from the country and leave as soon as the profits are exhausted. Even though the move 
towards financial liberalization seems likely to bring in future economic booms, future 
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